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Reforming Electric Utility Rate
Regulation Reform: Peak-Load
Prices Without Long-Run
Incremental Cost
Analysis
David J. Newburger*
One of the proposed methods for alleviating the present problems in-
volved in supplying the public with electricity is to change the manner in
which electric utilities compute their costs and, thereby, their rates. The
author examines the proposal that utilities convert to Long-Run Incremental
Cost (LRIC) pricing, a modified form of marginal cost pricing. After detail-
ing the operation and theoretical advantages of the LRIC proposal, Profes-
sor Newburger identifies the limits of those advantages as well as several
distinct disadvantages to LRIC pricing. Concluding that the advantages of
the LRIC proposal flow not from its kinship to marginal cost analysis but
rather from the existence of a price differential for service during peak
demand periods, the author makes an alternative proposal-peak-load pric-
ing based on cost-of-service allocation. Comparing the two proposals, the
author determines that his alternative will achieve the advantages of LRIC,
but will avoid many of the disadvantages.
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INTRODUCTION
RISING RATES for electricity and increasing awareness of energy
shortgages have stimulted considerable debate concerning possible
public utility ratemaking reforms. One widely supported proposal
would substitute a modified form of marginal cost pricing-called
"long-run incremental cost" or "LRIC" pricing'-for traditional
ratemaking techniques. 2 According to its proponents, LRIC pricing
would slow increases in utility rates by (1) fostering growth in the
quantity of new generating capacity that customers require only if that
growth makes rates, on average, more attractive to customers, (2)
helping ensure that the market will be willing to pay the costs as-
sociated with a utility's expanding capacity when customers require
the utility to expand, and (3) reducing the amount of time during which
utility facilities stand idle. LRIC pricing would achieve these results by
altering the consumption patterns of budget-minded customers. This
article analyzes and evaluates the LRIC proposal, and offers an alter-
native approach. 3 The alternative I suggest would contain the advan-
t Steven H. Blumenthal and Judy K. Raker have my special thanks for perserver-
ing research assistance.
1. At the risk of oversimplifying, "marginal cost" is the cost of producing the last
unit of a good or service; "marginal cost pricing" is the practice of setting the prices at
which goods and services are sold at their marginal costs; and "long-run incremental
costs" are an approximation of the more theoretical marginal costs that take account of
costs of capital equipment required to produce goods or services and reflect the fact that
such equipment is used to produce many units of goods or services simultaneously. For
further definitions, see notes 55-64 infra and accompanying text.
2. Traditional ratemaking techniques- require (1) calculating the total revenue a
utility must have in order to pay its expenses and provide investors a reasonable profit
and (2) setting rates, on a more or less average basis, among customers to obtain that
total revenue. One or more among numerous accounting conventions may be used to
develop these rates. For further definitions, see notes 6-35 infra and accompanying text.
3. 1 propose retaining traditional ratemaking techniques while obtaining the advan-
tages of LRIC pricing by adding a distinction in the rates charged according to whether
service is purchased during periods of peak demand for service or not. See notes 165-81
infra and accompanying text.
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tages of LRIC pricing, but avoid some of the disadvantages inherent in
the LRIC proposal.
Understanding this discussion requires certain background. There-
fore, part I of this article describes public utility commissions' 4
methods for determining total electric utility charges and for dividing
those charges among electricity customers. This part contains a rather
detailed description of the cost-of-service allocation process used to
divide those charges, so that the subsequent discussion concerning a
peak-off-peak pricing distinction will be more easily understood.
Some indications that traditional ratemaking fails to solve current
problems are addressed in part II. Part I details the proposed LRIC
pricing solution. Part IV explains its advantages, while part V outlines
some serious problems LRIC pricing poses. Part VI offers the alterna-
tive of peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service analysis. The two
proposals are compared in part VII. Based on the comparison of the
two proposals, I conclude that the alternative of peak-load pricing
based on cost-of-service analysis holds the greater hope for encourag-
ing rational electricity purchasing patterns and, therefore, that electric
utilities and commissions should adopt that alternative to modify rate
structures .
5
I. THE COMMON TECHNIQUE FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY RATEMAKING
A. Historical Cost Ratemaking6
A major responsibility of commissions is to set the rates that
utilities may charge their customers for services. Following the stan-
dards indicated by the Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Company,7 commissions traditionally ascertain the
total revenue a utility requires to meet its costs of doing business and
4. Various jurisdictions use different titles for the body delegated to regulate
utilities and their rates. Most prominent are "public utilities corpmission," "public
service commission," and "Federal Power Commission." For simplicity all are hereaf-
ter referred to by the generic term "commission."
5. Ultimately, this article focuses on the search for pragmatic techniques to in-
troduce peak/off-peak price distinctions to electric rates.Therefore, while it reviews the
basics of LRIC pricing, the article does not purport to extend economic theory. Rather,
it shows the pitfalls of applying economic theory as the exclusive basis for resolving this
public policy problem. I suggest an alternative that permits adopting the desired
peak/off-peak price distinction without incurring some of the disadvantages associated
with adopting a reform based exclusively on economic theory.
6. This discussion is very brief, as it is intended only to outline broadly the
technique of historical cost ratemaking. For a detailed discussion of these principles, see
J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); W. JONES, CASES ON
REGULATED INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1976); 1 & 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971); C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
(Rev. ed. 1969); 1 & 2 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION (1969).
7. 320 U.S. 591 (1934).
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then allocate rates among various classes of customers and services to
yield that amount of revenue. In electric utility ratemaking, commis-
sions have for many years directed their greatest attention to the total
revenue problem, leaving utility managements much latitude to deter-
mine rates charged particular customer groups.' A utility's total reve-
nue requirement is the amount necessary to cover all expenses, for
example-for operations, depreciation, and taxes-plus a "fair rate of
return" on investment in the company's assets (the "rate base"). 9
Under this system, determining total costs determines total rates.
"Historical cost" is the term used for this ratemaking technique
because it relies upon the recent history of operating expenses and
experience with the expenses of attracting investors.10 Sometimes
historical cost pricing is also termed "average total cost" pricing. That
suggests that the rate for each unit of service is based upon the average
cost of producing all or some large group of the units the company
sells, rather than the additional or "marginal" cost of each type of unit
8. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 287 n.l. Indeed, "[p]ublic utiliy counsel have
sometimes argued that ... the choice of a pattern of rates ... should be left to the
discretion of the [utility's] management . I.." Id. While Professor Bonbright and other
scholars reject that argument, the fact remains that utilities do play a very significant role
in devising rate structures. Accord, I A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 46-47; Kadane, The
Legality of Marginal Cost Pricing for Utility Services, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 755, 756
(1977). The article presumes the propriety of commissions playing an active role in
setting rate structures.
9. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 595-99 (1944). See
generally C. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at ch. 5; 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at chs. 4 & 5.
10. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 174 n.2. Analysis for this type of ratemaking
begins with data collected for a specified historical period, known as the "test period" or
test year. I A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 45. Commissions will change that data, however,
to account for fairly certain changes. For example, expenses will be increased to reflect
higher wages agreed to in collective bargaining or to reflect announced increases in
taxes. Likewise, if the utility expects peak-load periods to occur in the summer, and has
experienced an abnormally hot summer during the test period, revenues predicted will be
decreased. See Huntington, The Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the
Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689, 699-700 (1975);
Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the
Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 462, 477-80 (1973). More recently, commissions
have begun to experiment with wholly or partly "future" test years-that is, test years
based on anticipated data in all categories. Proponents of future test years contend that
ratemaking decisions based upon information a year to eighteen months old do not,
during periods of high inflation, permit sufficient rate increases to meet the utility's true
requirements. Opponents of this trend worry about the speculative quality of the data
upon which commissions will make their decisions and observe that the accuracy of the
data will depend in large measure on the utility management's objectivity and good
judgment. For a useful discussion of the question, see Gibbons, Some Legal Aspects of
the Future Test Period in Utility Rate Regulations, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 947 (1974). In any
event, these predictive modifications of the test year make the "historical" label for this
technique something of a misnomer.
[Vol. 28:556
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produced. 1 Ascertaining historical costs is a technical and difficult
task; some say it defies attainment.1 2 However, for purposes of this
article, I will accept the assumption that commissions do estimate total
historical cost with sufficient accuracy to achieve public policy goals.
B. Rate Structures Based on Cost-Of-Service Allocations
Having determined a utility's total revenue requirement, the utility
and commission must decide how to allocate rates among customers.
The starting point for the allocation process used with historical cost
ratemaking is recognition of the distinction between "cost" and
"price." Price refers to the charge made for a good or service-in this
case, electricity. Cost refers to the expenditure necessary to effect
production. The cost of a given level of output may or may not serve as
the basis for determining what the price charged for that level of output
shall be. The logic of historical cost analysis, resting as it does on the
proposition that "prices" should be set so that total revenues (that is,
total income from the "prices" charged) should equal total "cost,"
suggests that the price charged a customer should equal the cost of
providing service to that customer. To charge for electricity on that
basis, a utility-with commission oversight-must divide its total
costs of doing business among the various kinds of customers and
services. This dividing is called "allocating cost-of-service;" when it
includes dividing costs incurred jointly by different customer groups,
the cost of service allocation is "fully distributed. ' 13
11. In the literature, two different meanings are ascribed to "average total costs."
First, in the textbook discussions of marginal costs, average cost is defined as the sum of
each marginal cost required to produce a given quantity of output (total cost) divided by
the number of units of that output. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 469 (10th ed.
1976). Second, in utilities discussions, it is often used to refer to the average of costs
historically incurred for the subject utility to sell electricity at the present time. See, e.g.,
C. CICCHETTI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, THE MARGINAL COST AND PRICING OF
ELECTRICITY: AN APPLIED APPROACH 95-96 (1977). See also Investigation on Comm'n's
Own Motion into Elec. Rate Structures, Case No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 86 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1976), reprinted in UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at 50,850,
50,856 (abridged version).
12. For example, based on data up to 1937, Professors Stigler and Frieland contend-
ed that electric utility rate regulation makes no difference at all. Stigler & Frieland, What
Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962), reprinted in
UTILITY REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 187 (W. Shepherd & T.
Gies eds. 1967). A more hopeful, if reserved, view appears in Lewis, Emphasis and
Misemphasis in Regulatory Policy, id. at 212. See also 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at
327-29; Dunlap, The Three R's: Rate Regulation Revisited, 96 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No.6,
at 30 (1975).
13. For a fuller discussion of these concepts, see J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at chs.
4-5; R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS (1956); R. DAVIDSON, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY chs. 5-8 (1955); J. DORAN, F. HOPPE,
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Broadly speaking, the cost-of-service allocation process is made up
of four steps: dividing costs among the utility's activities; ascertaining
customer groups' patterns of use; classifying costs according to the
type of requirement that induces the utility to incur the cost; and
allocating each cost among customer groups.
14
In the first step, each of the utility's costs is placed in one of
several activity categories. Usually there are four: production, 15 trans-
mission, 16 distribution, 17 and customer-associated. I The nature of the
cost determines its category. For example, costs of constructing and
operating generating plants fall into the production category, while
costs for high tension wires fall into the transmission category. Once
the costs have been categorized, customer-associated costs are usually
isolated and treated separately from the other three categories. 1 9 In
trade jargon, this entire first step is labeled "functionalization of
costs. '20
Some cost items--certain management salaries, office furniture,
and transportation, to name a few-do not fit discretely into any of
these categories. Their cost is divided according to the ratio of costs in
each category, or according to a detailed examination of each activity,
or by some other method. 21 For example, a detailed examination might
require dividing the cost of general office space "by estimating the
relative space requirements of the primary functions,'" 2 ---that is, the
share of the total office space required by production, transmission,
R. KOGER & W. LINDSAY, COST ALLOCATION MANUAL (1973) [hereinafter cited as CoST
ALLOCATION MANUAL]: C. PHILLIPS, supra note 6, at 303-06, 346-56; 1 A. PRIEST, supra
note 6, at ch. 8.
14. In authenticating the outline of the cost-of-service allocation process, reliance is
placed largely on the COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, note 13 supra, because it was pre-
pared by members of several commission staffs at the instance of the National Associa-
tion of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and presumably represents a fair consensus.
Except for differences in detail, it is similar to the other works cited in note 13 supra. I
refer to other works where the Manual seems particularly obscure.
15. This includes all generating activity. COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra note 13,
at 6.
16. This includes "the transfer from one geographical area to another within a
system and also . . . the transfer of power to or from other utilities." Id.
17. This includes "the transfer of power from the transmission system through the
distribution system to consumers." Id.
18. These include "customer accounting, sales promotion and administrative and
general expenses. . . directly. . . assignable" to customers. Id. at 7. I have coined the
term "customer-associated" to refer to these since the CoST ALLOCATION MANUAL
describes but does not name it.
19. See id. at 7.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 107-08.
[Vol. 28:556
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distribution, and customer-associated activities. Thus, since not all
costs are discretely related to particular functions, we already see in
this first step the imprecision that plagues the cost-of-service allocation
process.
The remaining three steps interrelate insofar as each depends in
part upon the methodology of the others. The second step requires
gathering data to detect the daily and yearly patterns of electricity use
of each group of customers. This "load study" 23 monitors a sample
from each customer group with special meters that record customer use
patterns, such as the amount used each hour, or quarter hour, for a
year. The load pattern data collected in this second step provides a base
for deciding the extent to which each customer group causes the utility
to incur demand-related costs, part of the fourth step. Were it not that
the utility already collects quantity-of-use data in the course of ac-
counting and billing customers, that would also be collected in this
second step to provide a similar base for deciding the extent to which
each customer class causes the utility to incur energy-related costs.
As just noted the third step divides the costs placed in each of the
activity categories developed in the first step into "cost classifica-
tion. "24 While these may vary depending on the allocation formula
used in the fourth step, usually the costs are fit into one of three
classifications: demand-related, energy-related, and customer-related.
Broadly speaking, demand-related costs are the fixed costs of doing
business-for example, the costs of owning plant and equipment and
of operating some generators in order to provide service when called
upon (the "no-load fuel requirement)." 25 Energy-related costs are
those costs that vary with the number of kilowatt-hours produced. Fuel
is the largest single such cost, although there are others.
Customer-related costs are those costs that vary with the number of
customers the utility serves. They are the costs related to owning and
operating "a portion of the general distribution system. . . , includ-
ing metering equipment, meter reading, billing, and accounting.''26
They include all costs, fixed and variable, placed in the customer-
associated activity category in the first step. Thus, the three cost
classifications may be thought of as including all costs that vary
according to the number of customers (customer-related costs), all
other variable costs (energy-related costs), and all other fixed costs
(demand-related costs).
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at31.
25. No unanimity of opinion exists as to whether this "no-load fuel requirement" is
demand-or energy-related. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 31-32.
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The value of the three part classification becomes apparent in the
last step of the allocation process-allocating costs among customer
groups. Typically, the customer groupings are residential, commer-
cial, and industrial. 27 The costs in each classification (developed in the
third step) are divided among customer groups according to the rela-
tionship of that customer group to the particular class of costs. Thus,
customer-related costs are divided according to each group's propor-
tion of the total number of customers. Energy-related costs are divided
according to each group's proportion of the total amount of electricity
purchased. Demand-related costs, however, pose a special problem
that requires the selection of an allocation formula for dividing these
costs.
The special problem is that demand-related costs are "joint costs."
Not directly related to either the number of customers or the amount
each purchases, joint costs are incurred because, for example, a utility
has built a generator to provide electricity that will be purchased at
different times by different customers. Each customer who uses elec-
tricity from the generator might be said to have caused the utility to
construct it, but no individual customer is the sole cause. The utility's
cost of owning generating capacity for the sale of electricity in one
instant are "joint" with those costs for a sale from the same capacity at
all other instants. 28 Therefore, a method must be selected to apportion
the cost of owning generating capacity and of other demand-related
costs among all customers responsible for those costs.
A consensus exists that these demand-related costs should be
apportioned among customer groups based upon the patterns of use of
each group. However, no consensus exists for the best formula to
apportion cost. The leading literature discusses three.29 The "peak
responsibility method" apportions demand-related costs to each cus-
tomer group in proportion to that group's share of the total amount of
electricity used when the utility experiences its annual peak demand. 30
27. In practice, a utility will often use subgroups of these three. For example,
subgroups may distinguish between rural and urban customers or between large and
small industrial customers. The utility may also reorganize the groupings, for example,
by combining industrial and commercial into one group that is then subdivided solely by
the amount of customer demand. In this article, the simplified three group approach is
sufficient for discussion.
28. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 355-59.
29. See id. at 352-53; R. CAYWOOD, supra note 13, at 156-57. The COST ALLOCATION
MANUAL adverts to numerous variations of each. See CoST ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra
note 13, at 40-50. Davidson discusses eight methods. R. DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at
112-36. Bonbright reports that a Commonwealth Edison executive, testifying in 1953,
noted twenty-nine such formulas. J. BONBRIOHT, supra note 6, at 351. Granger adverts
to thirty. Granger, On the Allocation of Capacity Costs, 98 PuB. UTIL. FORT. No. 13, at
26 (1976).
30. See COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra note 13, at 41-47.
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The "noncoincident demand method" totals the maximum demand
each customer group makes, irrespective of whether that demand
occurs during a period of system peak demand, and allocates the
demand-related costs in proportion to each group's share of that total.31
In the "average and excess demand method,"
the assumed cost of that portion of the company's plant
capacity which would be needed even if all consumers were
taking their power at 100 per cent load factor is apportioned
among consumers in proportion to their average loads-that
is, in proportion to their kilowatt-hour consumption of ener-
gy during the time period in question. But the assumed cost
of the excess in actual plant capacity over this lower, hy-
pothetical capacity is apportioned "by applying the noncoin-
cidental peak method to the difference between maximum
loads and average loads." '32
While Professor Bonbright asserts that economists prefer the peak
responsibility method "at least viewed from the standpoint of cost
analysis," 33 no logical analysis compels selection of any one of the
methods. 34 For example, one might criticize the peak responsibility
method for failing to take account of the fact that off-peak use patterns
determine whether the utility acquires more capital intensive base-load
or less capital intensive peak-load generating equipment. Also, each
allocation formula results in different cost burdens among the customer
groups. For example, a customer that uses a relatively small share of
electricity during a utility's peak periods and has a group peak demand
occurring at some time other than during the system peak, will bear
less of the demand-related cost burden under the peak-responsibility
allocation formula than under the noncoincident-demand formula. In-
dustrial customers often fit this description. Lacking an analytical
basis for selecting from among formulas, a commission may base its
selection on other factors such as the perceived need to stimulate
industrial development or the need to suppress rates for certain groups
such as residential users. 35
In the end, this complicated four-step process for allocating costs
produces an estimate of the historical cost of serving each type of
electricity customer. This then provides the utility and commission
with a basis for charging customers. Each customer is charged an
amount equal to the cost of serving a typical user in that customer's
31. See id.
32. J. BONRIGHT, supra note 6, at 353 (quoting R. CAYWOOD, supra note 13, at 162).
See also CosT ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra note 13, at 47-48.
33. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 354.
34. This conclusion is reached by each of the authors cited in note 29 supra. See also
Kadane, supra note 8, at 770.
35. See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 368.
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group. Characteristically, rate structures are simple. For example,
residential rates include a minimum monthly charge and a charge for
each kilowatt-hour used in excess of the monthly minimum.
In theory the total amount that all customers in a group pay is equal
to the total cost of serving the group. However, the amount charged
each customer does not necessarily reflect the actual costs that that
customer group causes the utility to incur. Notably, since the cost of
service provided during peak-demand periods is higher than the cost of
off-peak service, a customer purchasing electricity during the utility's
peak-demand period causes the utility to incur greater costs than a
customer purchasing the same amount during the off-peak period. In
the past, the failure of utility rates to take into account the difference in
the cost of providing peak period service has not presented significant
problems. But, difficulties facing electric utilities since 1970 suggest
eliminating this pricing imprecision. Before discussing proposed reme-
dies, however, we should consider the full scope of the problem.
II. RISING ELECTRICITY RATES
For decades the price of electricity declined, "in sharp contrast
with almost every other price pattern in the American economy. 3 6
Yet, as the Federal Power Commission predicted in the early 1970's,
that pattern changed 37 and by 1975, electric bills required a higher
proportion of consumers' budgets than this generation had ever experi-
enced.38 Higher rates have brought new difficulties for electric
36. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY pt. 1, at I-1-
33.
37. Id. at 1-1-34 to 1-1-36.
38. This increase in personal expenditures for electric utilities is illustrated in the
following table. The figures represent the percentage of the total personal product or
service consumption expenditures devoted to electric consumption from 1930 to 1974.
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL PERSONAL EXPENDITURES
Year 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
% 0.86 1.08 1.27 1.00 1.09 1.38 1.57
Year 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
% 1.53 1.63 1.65 1.68 1.72 1.86
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES No. 635, at 396 (1976); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 SERIES G 416-469, at 319
(1976).
Part of that increase must be ascribed to the increased use of electric appliances over
the years. But part of the increase is also due to the rise in electricity prices that has
[Vol. 28:556
UTILITY RATE REFORM
utilities: outraged citizens are electing political leaders campaigning as
the proclaimed nemeses of utility managements and higher rates;3 9
President Carter and members of Congress are pressing for increased
federal regulation of electricity retailing; 4° prestigious critics are at-
tacking electric utilities for inefficiency and bad judgment; 41 and, in
the face of rate increases and adverse public reaction, investors are
viewing utility securities as riskier than ever before. 42 In the meantime,
outstripped the rate of inflation. Compare, for example, the overall inflation rate as
measured by the Consumer Price Index with the electricity price inflation rate between
1950 and 1975:
PERCENT BY WHICH EACH INCREASED FROM YEAR STATED TO 1976
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Electricity Price Index: 95.6 86.6 78.0 79.2 67.2 6.3
Consumer Price Index: 136.5 112.6 92.2 80.4 46.6 5.8
FEDERAL ENERGY AGENCY, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DESIGN PROPOSALS INTERIM REPORT
51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FEA RATE DESIGN REPORT]; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 708, at 439,
722, at 448 (1976).
As is evident, overall inflation exceeded electricity price inflation over the 26 years
analyzed. Since 1970, however, the price of electricity has risen more rapidly than
overall inflation.
For further discussion of rate increases between 1969 and 1975, see Huntington,
supra note 10, at 692-96. Among other facts, Huntington reports revenue increases to
investor owned electric utilities of 29.7% for the year ending January 31, 1975. Id. at 692.
See also Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Reform: Taxation
Through Ratemaking? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1084 (1977); FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRA-
TION, SURVEY OF RESIDENTIAL UTILITY COST 1975-1977, at Table I. Data concerning the
effects of rate increases on major industrial electric power users is widely published in
current trade publications. See, e.g., Revving -Up for a Rate Reform, CHEMICAL WEEK
Aug. 4, 1976, at 37.
39. See, e.g., Fellows, Utilities May Cut Connecticut Jobs, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1974, the 1974 Campaign Section, at 24, col. 3; Fellows, Steele Expecting New U.S. Oil
Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1974, The Campaign Section, at 26, col. 6; Flach, 'Common
Man' Teasdale Trips up an Aloof Bond, St. Louis Globe Democrat, Nov. 4, 1976, § A
(News Election Analysis), at 1, col. 1; Lindecke, Teasdale Found Bond's Flaws, But
Can He Fulfill Promises?, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Nov. 4, 1976, § D (News Analysis),
at I, col. I.
40. In the second session of the 94th Congress, a House subcommittee conducted
eight days of hearings on aspects of nine bills proposing to reform electric rate regulation
and increase the federal government's role. Electric Utility Rate Reform and Regulatory
Improvement: Hearings on H.R. 12461, H.R. 2633 and H.R. 2650 (Titles VII and VIII),
H.R. 6696, H.R. 10869, H.R. 11449, H.R. 11475, H.R. 12872 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rate Reform Hearings]. In the
first session of the 95th Congress, the House adopted H.R. 8444 which would, inter alia,
-establish national minimum standards for electric ratemaking to encourage efficient use
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electric utilities, which continue to feel the cash squeeze that
stimulated rate increases, championed measures to relax traditional
restrictions imposed by commissions and the marketplace.
43
of electricity to. .. assure that States which implement rate reforms are not placed at a
competitive economic disadvantage by reason of the failure of other states to implement
such reforms ...... H.R. 8444, § 501(2)(C), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
H8419 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1977). President Carter concurred in the proposal for an
increased federal role in retail electric rate regulation. 123 CONG. REc. H3328-30 (daily
ed. April 20, 1977) (Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress).
Unless Congress adopts the proposals, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(formerly the Federal Power Commission) will continue to set electric rates only for
wholesale interstate sales. Federal Power Act, §§ 201-05, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-28 (1970).
However, recent court decisions require the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to
scrutinize electric utilities' rates and to set wholesale rates consistent with the utilities'
retail rate structure. FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279-82 (1976); Cities of
Batavia v. FPC, 548 F.2d 1056, 1057 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (interpreting Conway broadly to
extend FERC jurisdiction). Indirectly, this increase in FERC responsibility will probably
affect retail rate structures.
41. See, e.g., Testimony of Horace J. DePodwin, in Re Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. 26309, Opinion No. 73-31,
Sept. 6, 1973. In addition to being an economic consultant, Professor DePodwin was
Dean of the Graduate School of Business Administration, Rutgers-The State University
of New Jersey, and Provost for that university's Newark campus. In his testimony,
Professor DePodwin stated:
Some problems, clearly, were not of the company's making, while others were.
The direction of the company and its management have not been equal to the
job which confronts them. The record of managerial errors is long, ranging
from bad engineering judgment . .. to inadequate attention to preventive
maintenance, customer billing, and the like.
Id. at 18. Of course, scholars and activists associated with the environmental and
consumer movements have often made similar criticisms. See, e.g., S. NOvICK, THE
ELECrIC POWER WAR (1976).
42. See, e.g., McDiarmid, The Rise and Decline of Electric Utility Credit, 95 PuB.
UTIL. FORT., No. 13, at 19 (1975); Stuart, Utilities FaceA Worsening Money Pinch, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1974, pt. 3 (Business and Finance Section), at 1, col. 7; Utility Stocks
Aren't for Widows Anymore, FORTUNE, June 1974, at 105.
43. A review of issues of the Public Utilities Fortnightly--a publication that general-
ly supports utility industry interests-shows considerable support for proposals designed
to reduce the cash squeeze. For articles urging that charges be permitted for construction
work in progress, see Brophy, The Utility Problem of Regulatory Lag, 95 PuB. UTIL.
FORT., No. 3, at 21 (1975); The Electric Utility Executives'Forum, 97 PUB. UUL. FORT.,
No. 12, at 68, 90 (1976); Mattutat, A Pragmatic Approach to Construction Work in
Progress, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 5, at 31 (1977); Schneider, Earnings Deficits in the
Regulatory Process, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 5, at 38 (1977). For articles supporting
automatic fuel, capital, and other adjustment clauses, see Brophy, supra; Crespo, New
Regulatory Developments and Research, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 2, at 20 (1975);
Dahlberg & Land, Managing an Electricity Utility in Today's Environment, 97 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., No. 4, at 15 (1976); The Electric Utility Executives'Forum, supra; Lee &
Healey, Project Financing of Large-Scale Energy Programs, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 8,
at 17 (1977); Schneider, supra; Pollock, The Cure for Regulatory Lag: Efficient Case
Load Management, 98 PUB. UrIL. FORT., No. 1, at 27 (1976); Sarikas, What is New in
Adjustment Clauses, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 13, at 32 (1975); Schiffel, Electric Utility
Regulation: An Overview of FuelAdjustment Clauses, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 13, at 23
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Rising production costs, capital costs, and the increasing amount
of time during which generating plants stand idle contribute to the
higher electric rates. For example, labor, fuel, and other factor costs
have risen faster than the inflation rate.44 Smokestack scrubbers for
fossil-fired plants and added safety features for nuclear plants have
contributed to higher capital costs;45 much of the advantage from
major technological innovations since the 1940's had been absorbed by
the early 1970's. Thus both variable and fixed expenses of electric
utilities have been on the rise since 1970.
Increased idle plant time has had a similar effect. Since no one can
store vast quantities of electricity, 46 and since utilities require suffi-
cient generating capacity to provide all the electricity demanded during
(1975); West & Eubank, Automatic Cost of Capital Model, 95 PuB. UTIL. FORT.,,No. 11,
at 27 (1975). For articles supporting future test years, see Brophy, supra; Crespo, supra;
The Electric Utility Executives'Forum, supra; Pollock, supra; Schneider, supra. Addi-
tional comment on future test years appears at note 10 supra. For the argument that rate
increases should be allowed to take effect, under bond, pending ruling on the applica-
tion, see Brophy, supra; The Electric Utility Executives' Forum, supra; Rosenberg,
Kilowatts and Capital: The Real Energy Crisis, 95 PuB. UTIL. FORT., No. 5, at 26 (1975)
(supports government subsidies to the industry, probably in the form of interest guaran-
tees); Schneider, supra. Lee & Healey argue that customers should be charged at a rate
that includes a contribution to capital of the utility in exchange for a subordinated
security. Lee & Healey, supra at 17. They also support a regulatory rule that requires
that ratepayers continue to pay for capital equipment regardless of problems that might
prematurely take it out of service. In addition to that outlined above, Schneider sup-
ports: (1) normalized taxation; (2) an automatic annual commission review of each
utility's earnings to ensure they meet authorized levels; and (3) changes that allow
utilities to finance large portions of their equipment at municipal bond rates. Schneider,
supra at 42.
All this makes it clear why the then General Counsel of the Federal Power Commis-
sion stated: "The ramifications of cash control, by governmental rate setting authorities,
are infinitely more significant than profit regulation-the textbook concept of economic
regulation or utility rate setting." Journey, The Months and the Years Ahead, in
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 1975: GAS AND ELECTRIC RATE DESIGN AND PRACTICES 9,
18 (P.L.I. ed. 1975).
44. Consider one example. As late as 1970 Westinghouse was selling uranium for
$8-10 per pound for twenty-year requirements contracts. In 1975, it cancelled its
contracts because it did not have the reserves to meet its commitments and the market
price had risen to $26 per pound. When The Power Line published on the subject in 1977,
the price had again risen, this time to $41.50 per pound-an increase of approximately
400 or 500% over the 1970 guaranteed levels. You Can't Be Sure If It's Westinghouse,
THE POWER LINE, April 1977, 1-2. Admittedly, a cartel may have artificially created the
situation. Panel Finds Cartel Had a Direct Impact on Uranium Purchases on U.S.
Utilities, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1977, at 3, col. 2. Nonetheless, it exists.
45. See also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 271 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); C. KOMANOFF, POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE 8-9, 15 (1976); Warren, Forward, to
POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE at ix-x (1976).
46. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 357; FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, supra note
34, pt. 1, cited in Huntington, supra note 10, at 690.
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the infrequent peak-demand periods,47 utilities must construct electric
plants that will be allowed to stand idle during part of the year. Idle
plant time is a function of "load factor"-that is, the ratio of average
output to peak output of a utility during a specified time period. 4s The
higher the load factor, the lower the amount of idle plant time. In
recent years, load factors have been declining. In 1975, electric
utilities' load factor was 61.4 percent nationally, down from 63.9
percent in 1970, 65.0 percent in 1965, and 65.5 percent in 1960. 49
Because these figures represent a nationwide average, they tell only
part of the story. Some individual winter- and summer-peaking utilities
experience even lower load factors. 5 Given that electric utilities have
very large fixed expenses to pay for their enormous investments in
capital equipment, even minor declines in load factors cause signifi-
cant increases in the average total cost of each kilowatt-hour sold.
Thus, increased idle plant time, along with rising production and
capital costs has helped to produce the new trend of higher electric
rates.
5 1
47. Although it is unusual, some utilities do not have substantial variations in
demand. See Re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 317,339-40
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
48. COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra note 13, at 104.
49. FEA RATE DESIGN REPORT, supra note 38, at 53; FEDERAL ENERGY AGENCY,
OPPORTUNITIES AND INCENTIVES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY LOAD MANAGEMENT 131 (1975)
(Conservation Paper No. 32). According to the Wall Street Journal, load factors av-
eraged about 65% until 1967. Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.). The
same article reported that electric utilities would be able to decrease their capital
expenditures by a total of $48 billion if they can boost their load factors to 69% by 1985.
There is a danger that if technological difficulties make generating equipment unreli-
able, an absolute limit will appear on the extent to which load factors can be improved.
For arguments suggesting that reliability is deteriorating for some utilities, see C.
KOMANOFF, note 45 supra; Comey, Will Idle Capacity Kill Nuclear Power?, BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1974, at 23. But see Chase, Clouding the Nuclear Debate,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Feb. 1975, at 39.
50. Komanoff presents statistics for nuclear plants showing their capacity factors-
that is, their availability when needed-to be between lows of 1.1% and highs of 86.4%.
Of the 110 plant-years reported for commercial reactors, 39 had a capacity factor of 55%
or less. C. KOMANOFF, supra note 45, at 144-48. Of course, individual circumstances
such as the fire at the TVA's Browns Ferry site account for some of the difficulty, see
Calhoun, The Fire at Browns Ferry, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 9, at 27 (1975), but low
nuclear capacity factors seem rather widespread. Coal-fired facilities also experience
low capacity factors for some utilities. Komanoff's data show coal-fired facilities have
capacity factors as low as 35.9%. Twenty-three of the eighty-six utilities about whom
capacity factors for fossil fueled plants were reported, had capacity factors for those
plants of less than 60%. C. KOMANOFF, supra note 45, at 154-58.
51. Increased load factors also allow the utilities to invest in a greater proportion of
base load generators-equipment fired by coal or nuclear power rather than oil or gas.
Executive Office of the President, The National Energy Plan 46 (April 29, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as The National Energy Plan].
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Such a situation challenges us to find ways to lessen customers'
pressure for constructing new equipment and to reduce idle plant time,
for doing so will slow the trend toward higher electric rates. This
article examines alternative proposals for changing the electric rate
structure to induce customers to change consumption patterns and thus
dampen that growth in the amount of new capacity demanded and
reduce idle plant time. While the alternatives are founded on different
theoretical principles, they concur in one essential fact: each would
price electricity higher if purchased during periods of peak-demand
and lower at other times. This would encourage customers to reduce
peak purchases-thereby lessening the necessity for new capacity-
and to reduce idle plant time-thereby lessening waste of capital
equipment. Since new capacity probably costs more in real dollars than
it did in the past, avoiding new construction slows pressures for rate
increases. Likewise, since an idle plant wastes capital, less idle plant
time may mean lower rates. But, if these alternatives do not change
customers' consumption patterns, they are worthless. If they do,
commissions should adopt one of them-or some variation-to
achieve the ultimate goal of rationalizing electricity consumption.
I. LRIC RATEMAKiNG
One proposal receiving wide attention among commentators 52 and
52. Since LRIC pricing purports to resemble marginal cost pricing, I based the
formulation of LRIC pricing's benefits upon the benefits thought to flow from marginal
cost pricing, namely, allocational efficiency and economic correctness. For additional
marginal cost pricing discussions, see the sources cited in note 58 infra. See generally E.
BERLIN, C. CIccHETrI & W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVES ON POWER (1974); FPC TECHNICAL
ADVISORY COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF INADEQUATE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY, THE ADE-
QUACY OF FUTURE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 34-37 (1976);
Joskow, Applying Economic Principles to Public Utility Rate Structures: The Case of
Electricity, in STUDIES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 17 (C. Cicchetti & J. Jurewitz
1975). For the proposition that such pricing is "economically correct," see Joskow,
Thoughts on Future Developments in Electric Ratemaking, in FEDERAL POWER COMMIS-
SION 1975: GAS AND ELECTRIC RATE DESIGN 33, 35 (P.L.I. ed. 1975) (emphasis original).
The justification for marginal cost pricing is also stated in energy conservation terms.
For example: "Theoretically, if electrical energy were priced according to [the marginal
cost] principle, energy conservation would be promoted through the market structure
.... " Comment, 6 ENVT'L L. REP. 10221 (1976). At least one author claims that
marginal cost pricing ends price discrimination. R. DAVIDSON, supra note 13, at 181. His
proposal, however, is long-since outdated by the literature and only approximated peak-
load pricing schedules. Therefore, his suggestion would only have tended toward elimi-
nation of discrimination. Further, as Professor Kahn pointed out, even in marginal cost
pricing the justification for discrimination would disappear only if average total cost
equalled short-run marginal cost. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 123. For a bibliography of
other sources, see N. Burg, Energy Conservation and Economy through Marginal Cost
and Peak Load Pricing of Electric Utilities (Council of Planning Librarians Exchange
Bibliography, 0 1356 Sept. 1977).
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commissions53 interested in tackling the problem of rising electric rates
suggests changing the basis for pricing from historical cost to long-run
incremental cost (LRIC) analysis. This part is devoted first to defining
LRIC pricing and second to explaining the need and methods for
restricting the total revenues resulting from this pricing to those jus-
tified by historical cost pricing. Succeeding parts will discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposal.54
A. LRIC Ratemaking as a Variant of Marginal Cost Pricing
Long-run incremental cost ratemaking is a variant of marginal cost
pricing, a basic notion of microeconomic theory: in optimal market
circumstances, sellers price goods and services at the cost of producing
the next unit of each, 55 or, at their marginal cost. For a seller who
already possesses the capital equipment to manufacture his goods, the
marginal cost of producing the next unit ignores the "sunk" cost of
capital expeditures. It includes only "short-run" marginal costs
(SRMC)-that is, the costs of the additional labor, fuel, and other
variables necessary to manufacture and sell the next unit. 56
In one sense, this is an ideal price for goods and services, 57 because
SRMC prices are considered "efficient" for allocating scarce re-
sources. A buyer of a good or service at the SMRC price decides that
53. Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Util. Rate Structures, Case
No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 4, 5 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1976), reprinted in
UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at 50,850, 50,851 (abridged version). For an indication of
that commission's reserve on the question of whether to adopt some form of marginal
cost pricing, see id. at 84-85, reprinted in UIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at 50,850,
50,855 (abridged version); Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH
434, 439-40, 445-46 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5
Pu. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 28, 34 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
54. This structure ensures consideration of the three interrelated problems which
Professor Coase believed were presented by the debate whether to substitute marginal
cost pricing for historical cost: (I) ensuring adequate revenues to meet earnings obliga-
tions, (2) treating the "divergence between average and marginal costs," and (3) deciding
"whether there is any rational method by which these common costs can be allocated
between consumers." Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA N.S. 169,
170 (1946).
55. Some have also described marginal cost as the amount saved by not producing
the last unit of goods or services. See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INsTrrUTIONs 65 (1971).
56. The distinction between "short-run" and "long-run" marginal costs is not so
clear in actual practice since, at some moment, all costs are fixed and, at others, all are
variable. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE 306-07
(1969). However, by common convention SRMC is used to describe changes in costs
other than capital cost, because capital cost is assumed to be fixed during the short run.
Thus, the change in total cost (as marginal cost is defined) would be the same in the short
run as the change in variable (or non-fixed) costs. See generally 1 A. KAHN, supra note
55, at 70-71; P. SAMUELSON, supra note I1, at 452, 457.
57. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 75.
[Vol. 28:556
UTILITY RATE REFORM
he or she is better off by paying that price for that unit than by buying
any other item available at the same price. When those prices are equal
to marginal cost, the consumer is able to make this choice from the
maximum level of output which society can squeeze from its scarce
resources. 58 Further, the amount paid is sufficient for the seller to
afford to produce that additional unit. 59 Thus, the seller has sufficient
resources to produce if a buyer wants to purchase.
Rates based on SRMC, however, may not provide revenues suffi-
cient to cover a utility's total costs since they do not include a charge
for the capital costs of new equipment. Further, such rates would not
signal the utility when to build or purchase additional capital equip-
ment since the charge does not indicate customers' willingness to pay
rates necessary to cover the cost of expansion. For these and other
reasons, both Professors Bonbright and Kahn, authors of the classical
works in this field, conclude that the marginal cost charged by electric
utilities should be "long-run" to include a charge related to capital
expenses. 60 However, to impose that charge on the single customer
whose purchase happens to be the one necessitating construction of a
new generator would be unreasonable, for it would allow some
kilowatt-hours to cost millions of dollars. Therefore, the suggestion to
adopt long-run marginal cost pricing is modified further to divide the
capital costs among the many purchasers who will take advantage of
the new capacity. "Incremental" is used instead of "marginal" to
emphasize that the capital cost of new ecuipment is divided over the
large number of kilowatt-hours which the new equipment can produce
or transfer, rather than being completely charged to the first in-
finitesimal unit of energy produced or transferred. 61
In effect, these modifications of SRMC pricing cause the bulk of
the utility's capital costs to be averaged among those purchases that
58. C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 11, at 91; 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 55, at 66-67; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 11, at 460-61; Coase, supra note 9, at
173; Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to Rate Design for Electric Corpora-
tions, Case No. 26806, at 7--8 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n) (Testimony of Dr. Paul
Joskow). The result of that proceeding is printed as Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
59. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 66-67; C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 388 (Rev. ed. 1969); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 11, at 460-61; Coase, supra
note 9, at 173-74, 180. This led the New York commission to conclude that marginal cost
pricing "will better serve . . . the . . . purposes of fairness and equity." Re Rate
Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434,449 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976). See C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 11, at 91.
60. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 395-99 (1961); 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 55, at 65-66, 84-86. See also Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing:
Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 WIs. L. REv. 47, 60.
61. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 75-77.
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may require the utility to invest in additional equipment. 62 Such pur-
chases occur when the utility's total service requirement is at its peak,
and thus, the long-run incremental cost of service during peak-demand
periods is greater than off-peak periods. 63 Because of this averaging,
LRIC pricing does not perfectly produce the results that support mar-
ginal cost pricing. That is, the buyer is not charged exactly the cost of
an additional unit of production at the time of his purchase, and the
seller does not necessarily receive sufficient revenues to meet each
buyer's demands, regardless of the nature of those demands.
However, LRIC pricing comes closer to those results than histori-
cal cost pricing does. Under LRIC pricing, the bulk of a utility's capital
costs are included in the calculation of the cost of producing electricity
during periods of peak-demand while under the historical cost approach,
they are, generally speaking, averaged among all periods of service.
62. R. DAVIDSON, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY 182
(1955). A variety of factors in addition to generating facility construction are part of the
calculus of what cost applies to peak and off-peak use and some capital costs may apply
to off-peak service. For example, Professor Cicchetti and his colleagues state that the
issue for new generating equipment may not be whether, but when, it should become
available for service. C. CICCHETI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, THE MARGINAL COST
AND PRICING OF ELECTRICITY: AN APPLIED APPROACH 7 (1977). What equipment will be
constructed depends on amounts of base, intermediate, and peak-load demand growth.
Id. at 8. Although new generating equipment may involve substantial capital expendi-
tures, introduction of the new equipment may reduce fuel and other operating costs. Id.
at 9-10. Changing the schedule for bringing a new plant on line changes the schedule for
replacing the new plant when it wears out. Id. at 1 1-12. Utilities must have reserve
capacity to assure adequate energy supplies notwithstanding equipment failures and
other uncontrollable contingencies. Id. at 13. There are power losses in electricity
transmission, and those power losses vary depending on the voltage at which the
electricity is being transmitted. Id. at 13, 20-21. Commitments to build new equipment
results in a loss of options to take advantage of new technical developments arising after
the commitment has become irreversable. Id. at 14-15. Peak demands occur for some
parts of utilities' transmission systems even though other parts of the transmission
systems may not be fully utilized. Id. at 19-20. In addition, one might include external
costs created by the utility-for example, the loss of clean air or clean water resulting
from the utilities' operation. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 6;
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). The effect of such negative externalities is
still being debated. Re Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 28, 37-38
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Comment, Reform of Electricity Pricing in the United
States, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 183, 200-02 (1975). For purposes of this article, however,
the simple statement in the text should suffice.
63. For purposes of actual application, this description may be oversimplified since
expansion of off-peak demand may require construction of the more expensive inter-
mediate and base load generating equipment. This and other considerations may suggest
to those designing LRIC rate structures that rate distinctions be drawn between more
than the peak and off-peak categories. Since the discussion here is of LRIC principles
rather than applications, the simplified perception that it is peak demand growth which
necessitates capital expansion suffices.
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Thus, prices to peak customers are higher than they are under historical
cost pricing, and they more closely approximate marginal costs.
64
B. Refining the LRIC Pricing Proposal to Constrain It
by Historical Cost Revenues
Since historical cost and LRIC ratemaking build from different
types of cost analysis, the total revenues that each method would yield
for a utility need not be the same. 65 As already observed, prices set to
recover "historical costs" should yield revenues equal to the sum
of the utility's generating expenses plus a fair rate of return on the
utility's assets. On the other hand, LRIC-based prices should yield
total revenues equal to the sum of long-run incremental costs of each
service sold by the utility. Therefore, presenting the LRIC ratemaking
proposal immediately asks whether changing ratemaking techniques
should allow a change in the amount of total revenues that utilities are
permitted. To answer that, we must understand why LRIC revenues
differ from those permitted by historical cost pricing, why most propo-
nents of LRIC ratemaking would modify LRIC rates to ensure that
revenues equal those permitted by historical cost revenues, and how
that can be done.
64. In one hypothetical instance, peak service LRIC rates may not exceed rates
based upon historical cost. That would occur if a utility experienced such exceptionally
steep decreasing costs that the bulk of capital costs plus the variable costs incurred to
produce more electricity than is presently within the utility's capacity is less than the
historical average cost-fixed and variable-of service. See notes 66-75 infra and
accompanying text. This will not occur if LRIC prices are constrained by historical cost
revenues. See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text.
Also it should be noted that some summer peaking utilities' rate structures include
higher charges for summer use on the theory that the cost of new capacity should be
borne largely by summer users since peak demand growth appears during that period.
For one of numerous decisions supporting that distinction, see Re Northern States
Power Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 385, 414-15 (Minn. Pub. Serv, Comm'n 1975).
This only imprecisely sets rates according to peak use, however, since that peak period
in which growth requires expanding capacity occurs during just a few hours of a few
days during the summer. Also, as already observed, allocating demand-related costs in
order to create the historical cost rate structure requires knowing the share of demand of
customer group during peak and off-peak periods. But, the seasonal rate constitutes a
composite of estimates of peak and off-peak use by typical customers. That applies to
each customer within the group regardless of whether he or she actually purchases
electricity according to the pattern of typical use. See notes 29-35 supra and accompany-
ing text.
65. "[Tariffs based on marginal cost may produce more, less or (by happy but
unlikely coincidence) precisely the same revenue as present tariffs .... " C. CccHErT-
TI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 62, at 97. See Investigation on Comm'n's
Own Motion into Elec. Rate Structures, Case No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 84 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1976), reprinted in UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at 50,850,
50,855 (abridged version); J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 60, at 298-301; Boiteux, Electric
Energy: Facts, Problems and Prospects, in MARGINAL COsT PRICING IN PRACTICE 3,
25-26 (J. Nelson ed. 1964).
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1. Causes For a Variation in Revenues Based on
Two Methods of Pricing.
Until the 1970's, commentators commonly assumed that revenues
to electric utilities, if LRIC-based, would be less than those permitted
by historical cost analysis.6 6 These lower revenues occur if the margin-
al cost-that is, the cost of each additional kilowatt-hour sold-is less
than the average cost of each kilowatt-hour sold by the utility. Profes-
sor Kahn propounded three explanations for marginal costs being
lower, all of which probably contributed. 67
First, he noted that up to the point at which a generator operates
most efficiently, each additional kilowatt-hour sold costs less to pro-
duce than those previously produced by the generator because variable
costs for the additional sale are about the same or less and fixed
costs-per kilowatt-hour sold-decrease as the number of kilowatt-
hours increases. Since the revenues based upon marginal cost pricing
for production from that generator is the cost of producing the last
kilowatt-hour sold times the number sold, those revenues will be less
than those based on average total cost6 -- that is, the sum of the costs
of producing each kilowatt-hour produced. 69 Given that these cost
decreases result from improved use of already operating capital equip-
ment rather than starting up additional equipment, Kahn labelled these
"short-run decreasing costs. "70
66. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 124-25. Professor Kahn discussed the possibility
that some electric utilities might not experience this, but he considered it an unlikely
oddity. See I id. at 123-24. Writing in 1961, Bonbright found that any exception to the
general rule would be unlikely in the American experience, but not so for the British and
French. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 60, at 15-16. Professor Nelson reported in 1964 that
the French authorities at Electricite de France assumed their utility would continue to
experience decreasing costs. Editor's Forward to MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACTICE,
supra note 65, at xvi.
67. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 124-30.
68. Here Kahn was using "average total cost" in the textbook sense: the sum of
each marginal cost required to produce a given quantity of output divided by the number
of units of that output. Compare this with note I 1 supra.
69. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 124. Actually, it is a bit difficult to envision utilities
experiencing this short-run decrease to any significant degree. The ordinary utility has
several generating facilities with which to produce power. When it starts the first,
presumably it starts the least expensive. Until it works up to the most efficient output on
that plant, it will have the decreasing cost. After that, however, the marginal cost will
rise with additional sales because each new unit started will be more expensive to
operate, being the next least expensive facility to use. The rise is not smooth, because
more sales from each new plant brought on line, up to the point of maximum efficiency,
will decrease short-run costs for that plant; but the cost direction is generally upward.
70. Id. at 124.
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The second explanation relates to large scale production
economies. Until the 1970's, electric utilities generally were able to
take advantage of economies of scale as they increased their total
production. 71 Since these economies result from investment in large
production, high efficiency generators and other capital equipment,
Kahn labelled these "long-run decreasing costs." 72 Kahn's third ex-
planation differs from the first two by directing attention to changing
costs through time, rather than to changing costs related to changes in
quantity of production for a stated moment in time. 73 The third, he
says, results from implementing technological innovations that reduce
costs of generation and distribution as time passes.74 Observing that
electric utilities had been in the decreasing cost situation for years,
Professor Bonbright, publishing in 1961, seemed to consider it possi-
ble that electric utilities inherently faced decreasing costs.75
By 1977, we knew this was not possible. No doubt, decreasing
cost forces still operated, but increasing cost forces had become quite
discernible by the mid-1970's. For example, utilities that use substan-
tial portions of their generating capacity must necessarily bring older
equipment on line with attendant higher operating costs, resulting in
increasing costs. Indeed, the tendency for utilities to operate in this
way will become more pronounced if, as some predict, demand grows
and capital development lags. 76 Also, utilities may experience dis-
economies of scale, and thus, increasing costs, if they must own
substantial amounts of capacity that stands idle most of the year
because it is required to serve only the few annual hours of peak
demand. Further, we have already seen in recent years that the cost of
constructing new capacity may exceed the savings gained from having
new and presumably more efficient equipment. Labor, fuel, and other
costs have risen at a rate higher than the overall rate of inflation.77
71. Id. at 124-26. Again, Kahn was thinking of average total cost in the textbook
sense. See notes I 1 & 68 supra.
72. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 124.
73. Here, Kahn was considering impact on average total cost in the historical cost
rather than in the textbook sense. Compare this with notes 11 & 68 supra.
74. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 127-28. Professor Phillips similarly explained
decreasing costs. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 59, at 21-23.
75. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 60, at 14,389. Professor Phillips recognized limits to
economies of scale but did not indicate whether, in his view, utilities face overall
inherently decreasing costs. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 59, at 26-27.
76. This might occur as new capacity becomes more expensive. See notes 45-46
supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., note 44 supra. In discussing increasing and decreasing costs resulting
from price changes over time, I have focused on cost changes which exceed the overall
inflation rate. This ensures that the points are accurate in real as well as nominal dollar
terms and is consistent with various authors in the field. See, e.g., Boiteux, Electric
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Changes in design standards, for example, to provide for greater
workplace safety or environmental protection, have increased costs of
construction without increasing capacity. And major technological
innovations may already be in service.
78
Overall, if a utility's individual activities are more often increas-
ing- than decreasing-cost, the utility is in the "increasing-cost" situa-
tion. That implies that the cost of the last increment times the number
sold is greater than the total cost of producing each of the increments
sold and, therefore, LRIC-based revenues would exceed those based
on historical cost.
Both commentators and commissions disagree about whether elec-
tric utilities in the mid-1970's generally experience increasing costs.
Some contend they do, 79 while others argue that the answer depends on
the operation of a complex of increasing- and decreasing-cost forces
that vary for particular utilities and in particular moments in time. 80
The first major ratemaking decision based upon an LRIC study
concluded that the utility involved-Madison Gas & Electric
Company-was not in an increasing cost situation.81 Other commis-
sions that have announced their intention to implement LRIC pricing
generally seem to anticipate that the electric utilities in their juris-
dictions experience increasing costs. 8 2
Energy: Facts, Problems, and Prospects, in MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACrICE, supra
note 65, at 26. However, many customers view a nominal dollar increase in costs as a
cost increase and for them any rise in the cost of labor, fuel, and other costs contributes
to the utility's experiencing increasing costs.
78. See, e.g., Per], Why Utilities Can't Build the Power Plants We Need, NAnON'S
Bus., Sept. 1975, at 75.
79. See, e.g., Mellon, The Financial Future of Electric Utilities, 23 FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS J. Jan.-Feb. 1976, at 62, 64; Rate Reform Hearings, supra note 40, at 1148-49
(statement of William G. Rosenberg Assistant Administrator, Office of Energy Resource
Development, Federal Energy Agency). See also Huntington, The Rapid Emergence of
Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L.
REV. 689, 740 (1975) (citing other authorities suggesting electric utilities are in the
increasing cost situation); Comment, supra note 62, at 185.
80. See, e.g., C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 62, at 138-44.
81. Re Madison Gas and Electric Co., 5 Pua. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 28, 37 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974). See also Cudahy & Malko, supra note 60, at 61; Note, Lexonomics
and the Electrical Utility Industry: In Search of the Optimal Rate Structure, 61 IowA L.
REV. 134, 157 (1975).
82. See Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Util. Rate Structures,
Case No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 5-6a (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n., Mar. 16, 1976),
reprinted in UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at 50,850, 50,852 (abridged version); Re Rate
Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434, 451-52 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 4PuB. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 209, 241 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974). The Oregon commissioner
applies a brand of LRIC analysis which differs widely from that generally discussed
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One reason for guessing that utilities experience increasing costs
lies in the fact that many have introduced scrubbers to fossil-fired
equipment and have built nuclear plants. Both of these technological
innovations have involved high costs, at least for a time; with more
operating experience, utilities may improve their operating efficien-
cy. 83 Thus technology which was either governmentally imposed or
implemented to achieve very long-range goals may have contributed to
increasing costs for the utilities in the 1970's, but further refinement of
the technology sometime in the future may shift the utilities' costs
downward, at least in this area of activity. However, that decrease will
start from a relatively higher basis.
The foregoing shows that at any moment, a utility may experience
overall increasing or decreasing costs and that, over time, it may cycle
from one to the other. Further, a utility experiencing increasing costs
will collect more revenues under LRIC pricing than it would under
historical cost pricing, and vice-versa for a utility experiencing de-
creasing costs. The next question, then, is whether LRIC pricing
should be adopted regardless of whether it produces revenues either
greater or lesser than those based on historical cost pricing or whether
LRIC rates, if adopted, should be modified in order to produce reve-
nues equaling those justified by historical cost analysis-that is, to
"constrain" LRIC pricing rates by historical cost revenues.
2. The Decision to Constrain LRIC Rates by
Historical Cost Revenues
Typically, commissions endeavor to approve rates which will pro-
duce revenues just sufficient for a utility to cover expenses and to
return a reasonable profit for investors. 84 Commissions exercise broad
discretion to determine proper rates,85 but they do so on an adjudica-
here. See note 169 infra. Applying his analysis, he finds Oregon's electric utilities
experience increasing costs.
83. See Shapely, Nuclear Power Plants: Why Do Some Work Better Than Others?,
195 SCIENCE 1311 (1977); Smokestack Scrubbers, Still Opposed by Some, Are Proving
Feasible, Wall St. J., June 14, 1977, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.).
84. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603-06 (1944). At least
one commentator has concluded that the Supreme Court in Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), freed commissions from this standard. See Bernstein, Utility
Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 223,250-60.
Nevertheless, commissions do continue to follow the Hope standard.
85. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 251 (1951); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); Pennsylvania
Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414
(1952).
86. See Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626, 634 (1945); Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y. v. FPC, 436 F.2d 904, 906-07 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Virgin Island Hotel
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tory-type record that provides a reasonable basis for its decision. 86
While not without its problems,87 this approach appears defensible. If
revenues were chronically insufficient to cover expenses and to pay a
reasonable profit, investors would refuse to support new securities
issues, a devastating state of affairs for firms in this capital-intensive
industry. Therefore, those who contend for adopting LRIC pricing
usually approve a caveat that would require adjusting rates to ensure
that the utility receives at least the minimum revenue dictated by
historical cost pricing. 88
On the other hand, no reason emerges to justify prices higher than
the minimum necessary to maintain investor support-the result that
would obtain for increasing cost utilities priced according to LRIC
principles and not made the subject of a revenue constraint.8 9 The
monopoly franchise precludes the possibility that new firms will enter
the market and force such higher prices down to "competitive"
levels. 90
Further, consider the result of adjusting LRIC prices to produce
historical cost revenues for utilities experiencing decreasing costs but
not those experiencing increasing costs: customers would be required
to pay an amount greater than LRIC prices in order to produce histori-
cal cost revenues for decreasing cost utilities but an amount greater than
that necessary to produce historical cost revenues for increasing cost
utilities. Such a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose result seems indefensible as a
Ass'n (U.S.), v. Virgin Island Water & Power Auth., 54 F.R.D. 377, remanded on other
grounds, 465 F.2d 1272 (3d Cir. 1972), appeal after remand, 476 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973). See also SEC v. Cherney Corp., 318 U.S. 80,94-95 (1943);
I A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION 502-03 (1969).
87. See generally Bernstein, supra note 84.
88. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 60 at 336; C. PHILLIPS, supra note 59 at
394-95.
89. Kadane, The Legality of Marginal Cost Pricing for Utility Services, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 755, 759 (1977). When calculating historical cost, commissions allow losses
suffered by a utility to be treated as operating expenses if those losses are within
reasonable limits as to amount and circumstances and were not the product of the
utility's own negligence or waste or the obsolescence of its equipment. 1 A. PRIEST,
supra note 86, at 66 (citing West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S.
63 (1935)). This principle has been extended rather far. For example, the Michigan
commission has permitted a utility to take as an operating expense planning expenditures
for a nuclear power plant which the utility cancelled before construction was commenc-
ed. In re Detroit Edison Co., Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 20,035 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
July 26, 1976). Regardless of the soundness of that decision, its impact is significant, for
it broadens the limits within which utilities may charge ratepayers for losses. See
generally 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 517. Given this expanded rule, ratepayers may be even
more justified in insisting that utilities be restricted to revenues equal to expenses and a
limited or "reasonable" rate of return.
90. This is the classical prediction of perfectly competive market behavior when
prices are "too" high. E.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 451--64 10th ed. (1976).
[Vol. 28:556
UTILITY RATE REFORM
matter of practical politics and unfair. Thus, most LRIC pricing propo-
nents approve reducing those rates if they would produce revenues
greater than necessary to cover historical costs.91 Commissions that
have announced support for the LRIC proposal indicate that they will
require that revenues be constrained to those justified by historical
cost.
92
Hereafter, I assume that the actual LRIC pricing proposal would
base rates on LRIC, but would modify them to allow only those
revenues justified by historical cost. 93 This may seem absurd, for if we
91. See Cudahy & Malko, supra note 60, at 61. Although his position is unclear,
Professor Bonbright tentatively signals that he would not approve constraining LRIC
rates by historical cost revenues if the LRIC revenues are greater. J. BONBRIGHT, supra
note 60, at 401.
92. See Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Rate Structures, Case
No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 84 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1976), reprinted in
UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325 (abridged version); Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15
PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434,451-52 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., 8 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 393, 417-18 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974), aff'd
sub nom., Publishers Paper Co. v. Davis, 28 Ore. App. 189, 559 P.2d 891 (1977). The
situation in Vermont presents an exception to this proposition. The Vermont commission
has allowed an optional rate schedule, permitting customers to choose to pay LRIC
prices. Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 67 (Vt. Pub. Serv.
Bd. 1974). The commission imposed no revenue constraint, and indicated that it anti-
cipated no harm to customers because presumably only customers "with the greatest
likelihood of saving money" would elect to participate. Id. at 84-85. Likewise, the
commission suggested that since rates were set at "incremental costs," revenues would
be sufficient to cover the cost of the utility's providing service to the electing customers.
Id. The Vermont plan raises two problems: first, if customers on LRIC prices increase
their peak period purchases and if they do not represent a large portion of the utility's
customer group, they may force construction that their rate payments would not cover.
This problem results because these optional rate schedule customers are charged incre-
mental rather than marginal costs. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. Second, if
those who choose LRIC rates represent a large portion of the customer group, the utility
may not receive sufficient revenues to cover embedded costs or may receive more than
necessary. This situation would come about because the utility's increasing-or decreas-
ing-cost situation would begin to have a significant impact on total revenues.
93. Two alternatives for implementing LRIC pricing have been proposed, although
neither are seriously considered by Professors Bonbright or Kahn in their respective
discussions. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 60, chs. 17-20; 1 A. KAHN, supra
note 55, chs. 3-7. The less drastic of these alternatives would price electricity at the
margin (presumably long-run incremental cost would be acceptable) and subsidize the
deficit between marginal and average total cost, or tax away the excess if marginal cost
revenues are greater. Professor Huntington summarily dismissed this suggestion, argu-
ing that: (1) commissions lack the authority to implement the proposal, (2) the proposal is
politically infeasible, and (3) shifting the burden from electric rates to taxes merely shifts
the focal point of the economic dislocation resulting from a difference between historical
cost and LRIC revenues. Huntington, supra note 79, at 741. The second alternative
would also price electricity at the margin, allow those utilities unable to survive to fail,
and allow the remainder to obtain whatever profit LRIC pricing happens to allow them.
This alternative likewise fails for Huntington's first two reasons, the second applying
even more strongly in this case. Indeed, it seems likely that consumer advocates would
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want rates that allow revenues equal to those suggested by historical
cost analysis, why not simply apply that analysis? Nevertheless, the
proposal has merit; by adopting it, a commission may improve cus-
tomers' patterns of consumption. However, we cannot fully evaluate
the merits of the revenue-constrained LRIC proposal without some
sense of how the revenue can be constrained-the purpose of the next
section.
3. Methods for Constraining LRIC Rates to
Historical Cost Revenues
This section describes six methods considered reasonable by
economists for adjusting LRIC-based rates either upward or downward
to ensure that a utility using LRIC pricing obtains revenues equaling
those permitted by historical cost pricing. In his classical work, Profes-
sor Kahn described four methods to constrain LRIC rates to historical
cost justified revenues-under those, LRIC might be adjusted (1) in
inverse proportion to customers' price/demand elasticity for various
utility services; (2) in direct proportion according to price; (3) in
inverse proportion to customers' price/demand elasticity, but only for
services that are price/demand elastic in the technical sense; and (4) in
accord with general income distribution policy. 94 Under the remaining
two, LRIC rates might be adjusted (1) by charging or rebating a lump-
sum or (2) by applying a game-theory approach to estimate best
combinations of results. 95 In his discussion of the four methods,
Professor Kahn assumed that utilities experience decreasing costs,
with the result that LRIC rates must be raised to obtain historical cost
revenues. Throughout this discussion, I assume that LRIC rates would
be constrained by historical cost revenue, regardless of whether that
requires the raising or lowering of LRIC rate levels. Therefore, we
must consider the propriety of applying these methods to increasing as
well as decreasing cost utilities.
staunchly oppose the second proposal, assuming as many do that utilities currently face
increasing costs, since such a change would raise total revenues above present levels.
In 1946, Professor Coase presented an economic argument opposing the first alterna-
tive, although his discussion assumed a proposal for short-run marginal cost, instead of
LRIC pricing, and was limited to a hypothetical situation much different from reality.
Coase, supra note 54, at 182. But see Vickrey, Some Objections to Marginal-Cost
Pricing, 56 J. POLITICAL ECON. 218, 218-30, 237-38 (1948) (supporting marginal cost
pricing with a subsidy to cover insufficient revenues).
94. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 144-47.
95. C. CQccHETTI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 62, at 97-98; Sorenson,
Tschirhart & Whinston, A Game Theoretic Approach to Peak-Load Pricing, 7 BELL J.
ECON. 497 (1976).
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Foremost among Professor Kahn's alternatives is the "inverse
elasticity rule": 9 6 "[T]he prices of various services should be marked
up above MC [marginal cost] in inverse proportion to their elasticities
of demand." 97 Thus, the commission would ascertain the degree of
price/demand elasticity of each utility service-that is, ascertain the
extent to which customers will increase or decrease their consumption
of each service as the price of that service falls or rises. Then it would
alter the price for services whose demand does not significantly change
with changes in price from LRIC levels toward historical cost levels
and leave prices for other services closer to LRIC levels. In other
words, the commission would move the price of services from LRIC to
historical cost levels to an extent that is inversely proportional to the
degree of the services' price/demand elasticity.
By applying this rule, LRIC revenues are constrained by historical
costs but customer purchase patterns remain much as they would under
unconstrained LRIC pricing. The advantages of LRIC pricing derive
from the likelihood that the new rate structure will change customer
purchase patterns in a favorable way. If the method chosen to constrain
total LRIC revenues upsets those purchase patterns, the purpose of the
proposal is defeated. Thus, the chief advantage of the inverse elasticity
method for modifying LRIC rates to produce historical cost revenues is
that it changes rates in the manner that least affects the consumption
patterns that result from unconstrained LRIC pricing. 9 This method
works the same for increasing-cost or decreasing-cost utilities, except
96. So denoted in Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 431,
451-52 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976), and C. CICCHETI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY,
supra note 62, at 97, among others.
97. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 144. Elsewhere Kahn approves the "long-run" and
the "incremental" modifications of marginal cost pricing. See id. at 75-76, 85. There-
fore, his comments about the inverse elasticity rule seem fully applicable to LRIC rates.
98. Economist Irwin Stelzer, testifying for the utility in the Madison Gas and
Electric proceeding, subscribed to this solution. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 60, at 61.
The New York commission recognized it as an alternative. Re Rate Design for Elec.
Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR)4TH 434,451-52 (N.Y.Pub. Serv.Comm'n 1976); accord,
Huntington, supra note 79, at 741-42. The California commission, which is vague on
whether it will adopt marginal cost principles for ratemaking but supports peak/off-peak
rate differentials, emphasized the inverse elasticity rule's usefulness in distinguishing
among customers:
In our view, the usefulness of the "inverse elasticity rule" is that it addresses
the right question: which type of customer are (sic] most likely to conserve in
response to prices? Even without a reliable numerical estimate of elasticities,
we can make a common-sense answer to these questions and modify that
answer as future research makes data available.
Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Rate Structures, Case No. 9804, Dec.
No. 85559, at 6 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Mar. 16, 1976), reprinted in UnL. L. REP.
(CCH) 22,325, at 50,852 (abridged version).
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that in the case of increasing-cost utilities, rates would be reduced
from LRIC to historical cost levels, while they would be increased for
decreasing-cost utilities.
The inverse elasticity rule has two potential drawbacks. First, for
customers of decreasing-cost utilities, income is redistributed from
inelastic-demand customers-that is, customers of a decreasing-cost
utility who have relatively inelastic demand will pay a greater propor-
tionate share of the utility's revenue while those with relatively elastic
demand will pay a reduced proportionate share, each compared to the
share they would have paid under unconstrained LRIC pricing. This is
income redistributive in that inelastic-demand customers are left with
relatively less-and elastic-demand customers with relatively great-
er--disposable income than would be true under unconstrained LRIC
pricing. The income redistribution phenomenon works in reverse for
customers of increasing-cost utilities. Some believe that the redistribu-
tive effect should be minimized, since ratemaking should not be an
instrument for redistributing income. 99 Even if it should be used for
income redistribution, it is doubtful that a public policy choice chang-
ing favored and disfavored customers would depend on whether the
utility is increasing- or decreasing-cost. Second, price demand elas-
ticities are difficult to measure.10 They require imposing alternative
rate structures and observing how consumer demand varies-at the
least, an expensive and time-consuming process.
These drawbacks to the inverse elasticity method caused Professor
Kahn to suggest a second method-to vary rates for each service from
LRIC levels in direct proportion to that service's share of the total
amount by which revenues are to be adjusted. This method does not
produce the same random income redistributions of the first method
and does not require measurements of price/demand elasticities. How-
ever, it is less than satisfactory because it does not induce the same
changes in customer consumption patterns that LRIC pricing without
the constraint would, and ultimately, it does produce an income distri-
bution that differs from that that would have occurred under uncon-
strained LRIC pricing. This method works in substantially the same
way for increasing-cost and decreasing-cost utilities.
The third adjustment device---changing from LRIC prices in in-
verse proportion to price/demand elasticity only for services that are
99. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 144-45.
100. Id. at 145. See also Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate
Reform: Taxation Through Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1084, 1099 (1977); Hunting-
ton, supra note 79, at 743, and sources cited therein.
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price/demand elastic in the technical sense-rests on the assumption
that some services have so great a price/demand elasticity that a
reduction in price by a given percentage will increase sales by a greater
percentage, resulting in a net addition to total revenue. This method
would prohibit lowering rates except for those services. All other rates
would remain at historical cost levels-levels that would be lower on
average because of the increased sales resulting from the adjustment
permitted by this device. 10 1 Thus, all customers share the benefits of
this method of constraining LRIC revenues, but some do not derive as
much benefit as they might from the other devices.
This device is not directly applicable to utilities in the increasing-
cost situation. If it were applied only to the highest elasticity customer,
the downward pressure on growth in the quantity of new capacity
demanded that is easiest to obtain would be gotten. But that would be
at the expense of those customers with high demand elasticities, for
they would pay more than they would under the historical cost rates.
Thus, not everybody benefits directly from the rate adjustment, as is
the case when this device is applied to decreasing-cost utilities. 1°2
Kahn's final device would assign commissions the responsibility to
set rates at LRIC levels and then rebate or charge (depending upon
whether the utility is experiencing increasing or decreasing costs)
classes of customers according to public policy determinations as to
how income should be redistributed. 10 3 Of course, if these redistribu-
tions were to occur in ways that are counterproductive to LRIC pric-
ing, the shift to LRIC pricing with such redistributions could defeat the
public policy goals of both. Aside from assuming that this defect
should be avoided, economic theory is neutral on how income should
be distributed, and therefore, it does not provide the basis for approv-
ing or disapproving this device. 104 Obviously, this device applies with
101. I A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 145-46. This occurs in technical economic language
when demand is price elastic, that is, when it is greater than "unity." See J. HIRSHLEIF-
ER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 115 (1976); note 114 infra.
102. One might argue that the customers experiencing the higher rates are benefiting
because they are avoiding rates rising even higher in the future, but that does seem a bit
speculative.
103. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 146-47. Of course, since he was assuming
decreasing costs, Kahn only wrote of increased charges. Electricite de France appears to
have used a variation of this method to avoid a deficit when it experimented with
marginal cost pricing. "There is. . . a slight divergence between average and marginal
cost-of the order of 7 percent. This deficit of 7 percent has been covered increasing the
schedules of marginal prices obtained, so as to reduce the most extreme differences
between old and new tariffs." Boiteux, Electic Energy: Facts, Problems and Prospects,
in MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACTICE, supra note 65, at 26.
104. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 55, at 147.
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equal force regardless of whether utilities face increasing or decreasing
costs.
In addition to Professor Kahn's four devices for constraining LRIC
prices, two more deserve examination. The first would set rates at
LRIC levels and make a lump-sum rebate to each customer. 105 This
proposal emerges during times of increasing costs, and it seems doubt-
ful that it would be supported if it required charging customers a lump-
sum to make up the revenue difference between LRIC and historical
cost rates for a decreasing cost utility. Further, depending on the size
of the lump-sum rebate (or charge), the method risks customers'
substituting other energy resources for or with electricity from a utility
even though unconstrained LRIC pricing would not suggest doing so.
And, it produces income redistributions that would be different from,
but no less random than, those seen as a potential drawback to the
inverse elasticity method. The charm of the lump-sum proposal stems
from the fact that the historical cost revenue constraint is achieved
without interfering with the price relationships of the LRIC rate struc-
ture.
The second device employs a game-theory approach to ascertain a
set of possible rate structures, in each of which each customer group is
better off purchasing electricity from the utility rather than setting up
its own separate facilities. Proponents of this approach, writing in the
context of decreasing cost utilities, have demonstrated that a "core"
exists that contains several possible rate structures, each of which
results in the best achievable use of resources. 106 This highlights the
fact that, for revenue-constrained LRIC priced utilities, several rate
structures that optimize resource allocation exist. Hence, the game-
theory method distinguishes the set of rate structures which result in
the best use of resources; however, this approach does not guide the
commission on which rate structure in the set to select. Indeed, it
emphasizes that there exists no single revenue-constrained LRIC rate
structure that produces resource allocation. And, adopting any one of
105. C. CICCHET"I, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 62, at 97-98:
When revenue requirements require a departure from marginal costs as the
basis for tariff design, customer charges (fixed monthly charges) should be
adjusted up or down as required to meet the revenue constraint. Additional
adjustments, if necessary, should be made depending on the particularities of
each case . . . .If the premise is that pricing at marginal costs will generate a
rational set of price signals to guide consumer decisions, it follows that depar-
tures from marginal costs to meet other objectives ought to do the minimum
possible violence to the basic structure of marginal cost. Adjusting customer
charges to meet revenue requirements serves that end.
See also Huntington, supra note 79, at 742; Aman & Howard, supra note 100, at 1096,
who refer to this as the "inframarginal approach."
106. Sorenson, Tschirhart & Whinston, note 95 supra.
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the best rate structures will produce an income redistribution that
differs from that produced by each of the others. Thus, a random
income redistribution also results from adopting this method. Further,
it is not clear whether a similar core of possible rate structures exists
for increasing-cost utilities or whether the approach is practicable.10 7
Also, like the inverse elasticity rule, this device requires accurate
elasticity information not realistically available.
One variation of these methods for constraining LRIC revenues is
to adopt "Lifeline" rates, which would give all residential customers a
minimum amount of electricity at a low price. Lifeline was originally
conceived as a rate intended to ensure that all consumers-but espe-
cially the poor-be able to afford sufficient electricity for lighting,
refrigeration, and other minimum necessities of life.10 8 While the issue
107. Littlechild and Thompson attempted to apply the game theory approach, appar-
ently with some success, for allocation of airport capital costs charged through aircraft
landing fees. Littlechild & Thompson, Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Ap-
proach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 186 (1977).
108. Thus far, commissions have been loath to adopt the Lifeline principle on its
welfare merits; some refuse to adopt the proposal because they doubt their authority to
do so. See Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion of Elec. Util. Rate Structures, Case
No. 6808, Order No. 62568, at 2 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Sept. 7, 1977); Re Pub. Serv.
Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 401, 448-49 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972),
aff'd sub nom., New Hampshire Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. State, 311 A.2d 513 (N.H. 1973);
Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH
87, 89-94 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v.
Pacific Power & Light Co., 10 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 449, 456-57 (Wash. Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n 1975); Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 67,
76 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1974). Others, however, have adopted the Lifeline result-
justifying it on the grounds (1) that customers who use only small amounts of electricity
are not a cause for rising electricity costs or (2) that flat or progressively increasing rates
for greater use (so-called "inverted rates") will induce conservation and end wasteful
use. See Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 65, 79-80 (D.C. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1973), aff'd sub nom. Apartment House Council v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 332 A.2d 53 (D.C. App. 1975).
With respect to rate schedules, we have one serious problem with the
schedule proposed by Pepco in this proceeding. We are persuaded by the
evidence of record in this case that low usage consumers have not contributed
to the need for the new investment and the new capacity required by Pepco in
order to meet its public service obligations. We do not believe, therefore, that
low usage customers should be required to bear the burden of significant rate
increases.
See generally Re Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 153, 174-75
(Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re California-Pacific Utils. Co., 17 PUB. U. REP. (PUR)
4TH 256, 267-68 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976) (to implement California's electricity
lifeline Act, CAL. PUB. UL. CODE § 739, "and to encourage conservation," the
commission introduced lifeline rates that are not cost-of-service based); Investigation on
Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Util. Rate Structures, Case No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559,
at 7-8 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976), reprinted in UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 22,325, at
50,850, 50,853 (abridged version); Re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 100 PuB. U. REP. (PUR)
3D 257, 302-03 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973); Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PuB. U.
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is still debated, Lifeline supporters contend that demand elasticity for
minimum service is very low. 109 Therefore, they argue that adoption of
Lifeline would serve as a reasonable method for applying the inverse
elasticity rule 10 or the lump-sum rebate to constrain LRIC rates by
historical cost revenues.
REP. (PUR) 3D 250, 253 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Re Georgia Power Co., 9 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 381, 391-93 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Re Consumers Power
Co., 14 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 370, 396-99 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re
Detroit Edison Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 223, 254-56 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976); Re Detroit Edison Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 209, 248-50 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1974); Re Northern States Power Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 385, 413-14
(Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Re Nevada Power Co., 14 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH
445, 455-56 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re Niagara Mohawk Power Co., 16 Pun.
U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 317, 336-37 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y., 8 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 475, 501-02 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975); Re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 85 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 276, 307 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Re Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH
259, 285 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1973); Re Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 9 PUB. U. REP.
(PUR) 4TH 224, 230 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n 1975); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 Pun. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 393, 418 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974), aff'd sub nom., Publishers
Paper Co. v. Davis, 28 Ore. App. 189, 559 P.2d 891 (1977); Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 16 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 36, 67-68 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1976); Pennyslvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 PUB. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 209, 242, 246-48 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974) (disproportionate
increases in the first block of the residential rate schedule resulting from disproportion-
ately rising customer costs may have offset the effect of the allocation of increased
prices resulting from increased energy-related and demand-related costs in the tail
blocks). See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra; Re Green Mountain Power Corp.,
Case No. 3758, at 3-4 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd., Mar. 31, 1975); Re Burlington Elec. Light
Dep't, 95 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 273, 278 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1972); Re Madison Gas &
Elec. Co., 197 PUn. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 109, 124 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Re
Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 10 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 185, 191 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975). In Re Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 10 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 74,76
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1975), the commission directed the utility to propose
methods by which the utility could ameliorate the impact of increased rates on the poor.
Subsequently, however, as Professor Huntington reports it, the commission indicated its
belief that legal limits on discrimination constrain it from going very far in that direction.
Huntington, supra note 79, at 755.
Precedent for approving Lifeline rates simply because of the protection it affords the
poor can be found by analogy to other circumstances. For example, Professor Kadane
refers to cases that approved special rates for charities, the clergy, students, the elderly,
and residential housing for the poor. Kadane, supra note 88, at 775.
109. See Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion into Elec. Rate Structures, Case
No. 9804, Dec. No. 85559, at 7-8 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976), reprinted in UTIL L.
REP. (CCH) 22, 325, at 50,850, 50,853 (abridged version); Re State Concessions to Poor
Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 87, 94-95 (Ore. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1976); Re Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 9 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 224,230 (Okla.
Corp. Comm'n 1975); OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS/SPECIAL IMPACT, FEDERAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION, THE LIFELINE CONCEPT, FEA/E-75/272, at 20-24 (undated).
110. Economist Eugene Coyle made a similar argument to the Oregon Public Utility
Commissioner. He based his argument on three assumptions. (I) Utility rates should be
LRIC-based, particularly for high quantity purchases-that is, purchases in the "termin-
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The adoption of Lifeline rate as a method to constrain LRIC
revenues fails, however, unless the utility experiences increasing
costs. If it experiences decreasing costs, a rate higher than the LRIC
rate would be imposed for this minimum service. Applying the inverse
elasticity rule, poor consumers with a small, inelastic demand would
bear a larger-than-average part of the total price increase needed to
achieve historical cost revenues."' And, applying the lump-sum ad-
justment, such consumers-requiring relatively few kilowatt-hours a
month-would wind up paying more per kilowatt-hour used than high
energy consumers. Since I assume that utilities probably cycle through
decreasing and increasing cost experiences,1 12 1 conclude that Lifeline
rates do not serve as an effective method for constraining LRIC rates to
historical cost revenues. Lifeline rates may apply a reasonable income
distribution policy, but one must recognize that the case for Lifeline's
al blocks," in order for customers in such blocks to have economically correct price
signals. (2) Charging LRIC rates in those blocks will generate revenues for a utility which
are greater than needed to meet its historical costs. (3) The difference between the
amount needed and generated would be a "windfall profit" to the utility and, therefore,
should not be allowed. Based upon these assumptions, Dr. Coyle proposed that the
economically correct solution is to price electricity cheaply for the smallest quantity
purchased (the "initial block") so that the windfall profit disappears. Investigation of
Reduced Rates for Energy Consumed by Certain Persons, Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Proceeding R-23 (testimony of Eugene Coyle, Jan. 16, 1976). Dr. Coyle's argument
suffers the same deficiency as the one suggested in the text-rates for consumers in the
"initial block" would have to be highest if the utility is in the decreasing cost situation.
The Oregon Commissioner rejected Dr. Coyle's argument on grounds that Oregon had
already adopted LRIC pricing and, therefore, that the excess revenue had already been
returned to ratepayers. Ultimately, he rejected Lifeline rates and ordered utilities to
continue moving toward adopting LRIC-based rates. Re Rate Concessions to Poor
Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 87, 94-98 (Ore. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1976). See also note 169 infra.
111. Professors Cicchetti, Gillen, and Smolensky make a similar argument against
using economic analysis to support Lifeline proposals:
[E]lectricity costs vary according to the time, place and voltage at which
consumption takes place; these costs are not a function of how much or little
electricity consumers have previously taken. Lifeline rates, and indeed most
conventional tariffs, make price a function of volume. Marginal cost tariffs do
not. There may be many reasons why it is socially desirable to transfer income
from one group of consumers to another, but it is not obvious that the best way
to do so is to give consumers signals which imply that the cost to society of
providing electricity is more or less than it actually is.
C. CICCHeTI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 62, at 98. Professor Huntington
observed that for companies in the declining cost situation it would be inappropriate to
press the cost of the Lifeline subsidy on industrial consumers who he assumed have the
highest demand elasticity and, therefore, should have the rates most closely associated
to LRIC in order to minimize idle capacity. That, in his view, left the residential
consumer, and particularly the middle income residential consumer, to bear the cost of
Lifeline. Huntington, supra note 79, at 744.
112. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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adoption depends on some public policy basis other than maximizing
economic efficiency.
As is readily apparent, each of the six leading methods for con-
straining revenues is fraught with either practical or theoretical prob-
lems, or both. None produces prices equal to those that marginal cost
pricing would. Thus, none can claim any logical advantage that makes
it superior, although the inverse elasticity, lump-sum and game-theory
approaches, or combinations of these, may be theoretically preferable
to ensure securing the advantages of LRIC pricing. That conclusion
emerges more clearly from the following review of LRIC's benefits.
Also, all methods produce income distributions different from those
that would have obtained under constrained LRIC pricing.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF LRIC PRICING
As already observed, LRIC pricing would make rates for service
during peak-periods-such as summer air-conditioning hours-higher
than off-peak periods. Proponents of LRIC pricing suggest that this
will induce budget-minded customers to change their consumption
patterns and that the change in consumption will produce three advan-
tages-(1) fostering growth in the quantity of new generating capacity
that customers require only if that growth makes rates, on average,
more attractive to customers; (2) helping ensure market willingness to
pay for new capacity when customers require the utility to construct
that capacity; and (3) improving load factors to reduce the cost of idle
capacity. Collectively, these advantages will contribute to slowing the
increase of rates and may in some cases, induce a decrease in rates.
The operation of each of these advantages is more understandable for
utilities experiencing increasing costs. Therefore, this section first
reviews the advantages of LRIC pricing in the context of increasing
costs, and then for utilities experiencing decreasing costs.
In the case of increasing cost utilities, slowing the growth in
customer requirements for additional service slows average rate in-
creases for those utilities, because growth in the quantity of service
demanded will require new capital equipment purchases that cost more
per kilowatt-hour sold. Therefore, for LRIC pricing to offer the first
advantage suggested for it, it must be that LRIC pricing will slow the
growth in customer requirements for new generating capacity. That it
does slow that growth depends on two assumptions: that customers
lower or raise their consumption as price increases or decreases-that
is, that consumption is sensitive to price changes; and that LRIC rates
for services during peak-periods will be higher than historical cost
prices. If those assumptions are correct, shifting to LRIC rates will
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slow the growth in the quantity of new capacity demanded and,
therefore, slow average rate increases.
These two assumptions do seem sound. Recent studies seem to
establish convincingly that demand for electricity is sensitive to
price,1 13 especially in the long-run' 4 -thus verifying the first assump-
tion. The review of historical cost and LRIC pricing already completed
tends to support the second: under LRIC pricing, the utility's capital
costs are mostly allocated to service during peak-demand periods, thus
producing a price for peak-demand service that is higher than that for
off-peak service.115 Under historical cost pricing, capital costs are
generally averaged over all sales. Consequently, since the utility is
assumed to be experiencing increasing costs, the LRIC price during
peak-demand periods must be higher than the historical cost price.
Only if the revenue constraint imposed on LRIC pricing puts most of
the rate reduction into services during peak-demand periods could this
be otherwise. Obviously, to slow growth in the quantity of new
capacity demanded, one would confine selection of a method for
constraining revenues to those methods which keep the revenue-
constrained LRIC price for service during peak-demand periods above
historical cost rates.
For utilities experiencing increasing costs, the second advantage of
helping ensure that customers are willing to pay for new facilities also
flows from peak-demand LRIC rates being higher than historical cost
rates. The higher LRIC peak rate means that the utility will receive
additional revenues to cover the cost of additional equipment if cus-
tomers are demanding that additional equipment by purchasing elec-
tricity during the peak period. On the other hand, we should recall that
the LRIC rates raise only part of the cost of the new capacity unless the
total additional amount of electricity demanded equals the total capac-
113. The text speaks of price "sensitivity" rather than "elasticity," because price
increases might depress demand but at a rate which economists conventionally refer to
as "inelastic." For example, if a 1% price increase depresses demand 0.75% then
demand is price sensitive, but according to economic convention "inelastic." See P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 89, at 380. The data on whether peak demand for electricity is
price elastic are inconclusive for the long-run. It is likely inelastic, though price sensi-
tive, in the short-run.
114. See summaries of the studies in FEA RATE DECISION REPORT, supra note 38, at
App. C; Taylor, The Demand for Electricity: A Survey, 6 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1975); N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1976, at 33, col. 4-5 (reporting that 200 residential customers being billed
in an experimental time-of-day pricing program tended to shift demand for electricity
away from high priced, peak demand periods). See also FPC TECHNICAL ADVISORY
COMM. ON CONSERVATION OF ENERGY, POWER GENERATION: CONSERVATION, HEALTH,
AND FUEL SUPPLY 35-44 (1975); Huntington, supra note 79, at 728-29; FEDERAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION, SURVEY OF RESIDENTIAL UTILITY COSTS 1975-1977 (Sept. 1977).
115. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
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ity of the new generating facility. The averaging involved in using
"incremental" rather than "marginal" cost pricing produces this
result 11 so that when customers demand less than all the new capacity,
they purchase less than all the available increments of electricity.
Therefore, not all the capital cost is covered. Further, given the
revenue constraint on LRIC rates, a utility in the increasing cost
situation would not receive revenues sufficient to cover the cost of new
generating facilities unless no part of the reduction from LRIC to
historical cost levels occurs in the peak service rates-an unlikely
event. Nevertheless, those customers who continue to demand more
electricity at peak periods, even with the higher LRIC rates, indicate
their willingness to pay part of the cost of increased capacity. 117 That
indication does not emerge from historical cost rates.
The first two advantages of LRIC pricing are close companions.
Together, they signal the customer to purchase only that electricity for
which he or she is willing to pay the cost of production. Conversely,
they show the customer the cost of his or her decision to purchase
additional electricity. The third advantage is a corollary of the first
two. Since LRIC pricing discourages additional electricity purchases
during periods of peak demand and, if anything, encourages off-peak
purchases, LRIC pricing will reduce idle plant time, thus stimulating
increased load factors.
Taken together, these advantages will contribute to the slowing of
rate increases for the budget-minded consumer of an increasing-cost
utility. Those who wish to avoid rate increases will shift their
consumption pattern, consuming relatively more electricity during off-
peak hours. The reduced demand for peak-hour service and improved
load factors during off-peak hours will allow the utility to avoid or
delay capital expansion. As capital costs stay constant, while the
number of kilowatt-hour sales over which to divide them increases, the
result is downward pressure on average costs. Further, when capital
expansion is avoided, the upward pressure on average rates due to the
fact that the increased costs of capital construction have outstripped
the inflation rate is also avoided. Without the revenue constraint, this
beneficial impact upon average rates could be offset by the rate
increases caused by the shift from historical cost to LRIC pricing. But,
given the proposed revenue constraint, shifting to LRIC rates will slow
average rate increases if the shift induces customers to change their
patterns of consumption.
116. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
117. The fact that some but not all the cost of additional sales is covered by additional
revenue implies that prices have shifted toward the marginal cost ideal, but have failed to
achieve it completely. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
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These advantages also accrue for utilities experiencing decreasing
costs. Under LRIC pricing without the revenue constraint, the price of
electricity is lower for off-peak service, thus encouraging increased
quantities of off-peak sales. Since the decreasing cost situation implies
lower average rates as the quantity of sales increase, this growth in
quantity demanded may actually encourage rate decreases.11 8 LRIC
pricing will even encourage peak-sales growth if the decreasing cost is
sufficiently pronounced, with the result that LRIC pricing will pro-
duce rates that encourage growth in quantity demand that over time
will produce lower average costs and, thus, lower rates. The decreas-
ing-cost utility's effectiveness in using revenue-constrained LRIC rates
to achieve these benefits depends, as it did for increasing-cost utilities,
on the nature of the constraint. 119
The second advantage-that of helping ensure customer willing-
ness to cover the cost of new facilities-is also present for decreasing-
cost utilities, because the price for peak service is higher than the price
for off-peak service. However, unless a situation develops in which the
peak-demand LRIC price is greater than the historical cost price,
historical cost pricing of a decreasing-cost utility promises the same
advantage since both the LRIC and the historical cost price would on
aggregate be at least sufficient to cover new facility costs.
Improved load factors are the most obvious benefit to accrue to
decreasing-cost utilities shifting to LRIC rates. Assuming
price/demand sensitivity and noting that, under LRIC rates, peak use
always costs more than off-peak use, LRIC rates will encourage
customers to shift away from peak-demand, thus encouraging less idle
plant time. 120
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE LRIC PROPOSAL
As must be anticipated, LRIC pricing is not without its problems.
Thus, we should consider both the qualification of the actual extent of
these advantages and the disadvantages of LRIC pricing.
118. This would only happen, of course, where the price elasticity of demand at the
point where the price reduction is made is greater than unity. See note 101 supra and
accompanying text.
119. See I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
144-46 (1971).
120. For a different though equally valid effort to summarize LRIC pricing's benefits,
see Kadane, supra note 88, at 764-67.
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A. Qualification of the Advantages of Revenue-Constrained
LRIC Pricing
As we have seen, the advantages of LRIC pricing depend
completely on the significance of the price/demand sensitivity of the
utility's customer group. Also, if LRIC pricing does produce these
advantages, it does so not because of the inherent correctness of
marginal cost pricing but because LRIC pricing happens to produce
higher prices for service during peak-demand periods. Further, other
cost forces may counterbalance LRIC pricing's ability to dampen the
increases in electricity rates.
Since current studies suggest that consumer demand for electricity
is sensitive to price changes, 121 the fact that the advantages of LRIC
pricing depend on that price sensitivity is not particularly troublesome.
However, we must recognize that there are distinctly finite limits
within which changes in price will change demand. This is particularly
apparent in the short-run. For example, a customer heating a home
with electric space heat and living in a winter-peaking utility's service
area, cannot reduce below a certain level the amount of electricity used
to heat, no matter how high the peak-demand period price. 122 In the
long-run such a customer may shift to another heating method-solar,
gas, or some other--or move to a smaller or better insulated house or
apartment. But, peak-period electricity prices would have to be very
high indeed to induce the customer to make such a major change.
Thus, we must recognize both the limits of LRIC pricing as a reform if
customer price sensitivity is small and the possibility that using it
extensively may force dramatic changes in American lifestyles if that
price sensitivity turns out to be large.
As already noted, the advantages of LRIC pricing do not flow from
the theory of LRIC pricing, but from the fact that LRIC rates, with
capital costs being largely charged to service during peak-demand
periods, happen to dictate a peak/off-peak price distinction and there-
by take advantage of price/demand sensitivity. Any rate structure that
makes the same distinction may secure the same benefits. 123 Further,
depending upon customers' price/demand sensitivities for various
121. See note 114 supra.
122. The consumer's price elasticity of demand at that low level would be equal to
zero in the short run, which is known generally as "perfect inelasticity." P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 89, at 380.
123. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 79, at 723-25, where the author lists savings in
the areas of demand for new capital expenditures and demand for fuel as the potentials
for savings resulting from LRIC pricing and then states that LRIC pricing might produce
such savings because it takes advantage of consumers' price/demand sensitivity.
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services and public policy judgments about the extent to which
consumption need be shifted to off-peak periods, a rate structure that
makes greater or lesser distinctions may be preferable. 124
Indeed, some management decisions may affect the difference
between peak and off-peak LRIC prices. For example, baseload equip-
ment-that is, very large coal- or nuclear-fueled geneators-is very
expensive to own but not very expensive to operate. Intermediate and
peak equipment-that is, relatively smaller coal-fueled and oil- or gas-
fueled generators-are respectively less expensive to own but more
expensive to operate. Thus, if a management decides to shift future
capital purchases to baseload equipment, the capital costs would rise
and variable costs decline. Since those higher capital costs are charged
chiefly to peak-demand service, t25 this management decision would
tend to increase the peak/off-peak price distinction. Thus, even LRIC
pricing may introduce a variety of peak/off-peak price distinctions,
some of which may be preferable to others.
On the subject of inducing slower rate increases or rate decreases,
one must exercise extreme caution to avoid overstatement. 126 First, the
124. The vice president in charge of economic studies for Electricite de France (EDF)
discussed peak-load pricing in an article first published in 1949 in France and republished
and updated in 1960. Boiteux, Peak-Load Pricing, 33 J. Bus. 157 (1960). Boiteux
generally assumed that marginal cost pricing was the device to institute "peak-load
pricing." However, the discussion of smoothing the load curve (that is, reducing peak
and increasing off-peak demand) focuses on demand elasticities, not marginal costs. Id.
at 172-75. Boiteux and his colleagues at EDF pioneered peak-load pricing as a practical
application of marginal cost pricing. See Editor's Forward to MARGINAL COST PRICING IN
PRA CrIcE, at viii (J. Nelson ed. 1964); Marschak, Capital Budgeting and Pricing in the
French Nationalized Industries, 33 J. Bus. 133 (1960). Marschak also directed attention
to demand, not marginal cost, as the key to EDF's "peak-load pricing" rate structure.
Id. at 146-51.
125. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
126. Representative Ashley, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee charged with
shepherding the House energy bill, H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), also recog-
nized this as a problem. Responding to the question whether enactment of the energy bill
would reduce electric rates, he stated:
No, no more than the prices of automobiles are going to go down. .... [W]e
have an energy problem and the energy bill before us does not mean the earth
will cease spinning on its orbit but it does mean, although we will not dramat-
ically reduce the price of fuel, we will proceed at a much more temperate pace
and provide opportunities for consumers to save on their electric bills.
We are not in this bill legislating price controls, let this be clear. . . . We
are trying to provide rate structures that will reflect the true cost of providing
electric service to each class of electric consumers and will provide electric
consumers with opportunities to conserve energy and their money through
peak-load pricing techniques.
123 CONG. REC. H8563 (daily ed., Aug. 4, 1977). The bill Representative Ashley was
supporting did not necessarily require LRIC pricing though it did support peak-load
pricing. See note 170 and text accompanying notes 166-72 infra.
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proposition itself must be kept clearly in mind: LRIC pricing repre-
sents one force that under proper circumstances discourages rate in-
creases or encourages decreases. Other forces, such as fuel, labor, and
costs of capital, may work in the other direction to outweigh complete-
ly the LRIC induced trend. 127 Second, the beneficial effect on rates is
seen most clearly for a utility in the increasing-cost situation, when the
marginal cost (and thus the LRIC) for each additional unit is greater
than the average total cost (and thus the historical cost). For such a
utility, depressing growth in customer requirements for additional
quantities of output avoids increases in average cost. Third, for utilities
experiencing increasing costs the trend occurs only if we assume that
the LRIC revenues are constrained by revenues allowed in historical
cost analysis. Otherwise the shift to LRIC rates from historical cost
will itself necessitate a rate increase. 28
B. The Disadvantages of LRIC Pricing
LRIC pricing has six important disadvantages: (1) the technique
risks the possibility that the utility's revenues will become unstable and
vary from the total revenues approved by the commission; (2) LRIC
pricing, even if constrained by historical cost revenue, may produce
random and unjustified income redistributions; (3) long-run, incre-
mental, and revenue constraint modifications of marginal cost pricing
imposed to arrive at the pricing reform proposal, may make the
proposal so different from marginal cost pricing that the advantages of
marginal cost pricing are lost; (4) LRIC pricing may require commis-
sions to become more involved in planning activities traditionally
reserved to management; (5) new and difficult administrative problems
will arise, especially the deterioration in the quality of information
upon which commissions base decisions; and (6) both utilities and
customers may show a natural political opposition to LRIC pricing.
1. Revenue Instability
As with any massive rate-structure reform, the institution of LRIC
pricing may affect the utility's financial stability during the transition
period. 12 9 The law is clear: commissions may not reduce nor may
utilities increase allowed revenues in order to recapture excess profits
127. See note 44 supra.
128. See notes 88-105 supra and accompanying text.
129. Maintaining stable revenues for electric utilities is a major responsibility of
ratemaking. See R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMIcs 28-30 (1956).
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or to cover unexpected losses experienced in prior years. 130 If a
commission inaugurating a new rate structure misjudges the amount of
revenue that rate structure will produce, the utility may suddenly find
itself either wealthy or unable to meet its securities obligations and
maintain earnings. These possibilities are particularly acute for utilities
changing to LRIC pricing, and are primarily a function of two factors.
First, since LRIC prices charge most of the cost of capital to service
during peak periods, the amount of revenue obtained depends signifi-
cantly upon how promptly consumers adjust their peak demand in
response to the new rate structure. Hence, minor changes in consumer
demand during periods when the peak price is in effect can produce
major changes in revenues. However, since it seems that consumer
demand is not highly sensitive to price in the short-run,131 this potential
for wide shifts in revenues may not occur. 132 On the other hand, no one
has yet implemented LRIC pricing on a utility-wide basis.
Second, peak demand is very weather sensitive.' 33 Under any
pricing method, an extremely hot or cold summer could drastically
change a summer-peaking electric utility's demand and thus its reve-
nues; such extremes in winter could likewise affect winter-peaking
utilities. However, LRIC pricing exaggerates the problem again be-
cause charges to cover capital costs are largely made in peak-period
prices. Thus, weather-induced variations in peak demand produce
disproportionately larger variations in revenues under LRIC pricing
130. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,590 (1942) ("The deficiency may
not be thus added to the rate base, for the obvious reason that the hazard that the
property will not earn a profit remains on the company in the case of a regulated, as well
as an unregulated, business."); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289
U.S. 287, 313 (1933); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23,
31 (1926). Of course, in setting future rates, a commission may adjust an allowed rate of
return to prevent the utility from continuing to realize excessive profits or losses. See,
e.g., FPC Uniform System of Accounts for Class A and Class B Public Utilities and
Licensees, 18 C.F.R., pt. 101, Account No. 182 (1976). Although the "adjustments"
made by some commissions seem suspiciously similar to those past losses which are not
permitted to be recovered in subsequent years, see note 88 supra; In re Detroit Edison
Co., Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 120,035, at 16,221 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976), even
those commissions recognize the black letter principle of FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942), and it is unlikely that they would stray far from that result. Id.
at 16,223.
131. Although there is price sensitivity, consumer demand appears to be technically
"inelastic" in the short-run. See note 114 supra.
132. One might counter this argument by suggesting that LRIC pricing be gradually
introduced over a period of years. That may reduce the volatility of the revenue
instability for any given moment, but it will continue the duration of the instability over
an extended period of time.
133. R. DAVIDSON, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY 184
(1955).
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than under historical cost pricing. 134
2. Random and Unjustified Income Redistributions
The revenue constraint ensures that the total LRIC-based revenue
realized by an electric utility is equal to that dictated by historical cost
analysis. However, given the different methods for setting rates, it
would be purely coincidental for customers or customer classes to bear
the same proportionate share of the contributions to utility revenues
that they do under historical cost pricing. Thus, except for unlikely
coincidence, changing to revenue-constrained LRIC pricing will pro-
duce income redistributions among customers and customer classes.
Arguably, this is as it should be; a group experiencing a serious rate
increase resulting from the shift was simply underpriced before. On the
other hand, customers have invested in plant and equipment based
upon the assumption that their group's share of revenue contributions,
and the trends in the changing proportion of that share, will continue.
Unless gaining the advantages of LRIC pricing requires such changes,
no justification emerges for making such random and potentially dras-
tic changes in these shares and trends. This point becomes clearer upon
consideration of both the relationships among customer groups and the
possibility that changing those relationships is unnecessary.
Traditionally, residential users have paid a higher average per
kilowatt-hour price than other groups, and industrial users have paid
the lowest. For example, in 1975, residential and rural (many being
residential) customers accounted for only 33.8 percent of electricity
utility sales, but 40.1 percent of revenues, while industrial customers
accounted for 38.2 percent of sales and only 27.1 percent of reve-
nues. 135 On the other hand, the gap narrows. Between 1945 and 1975,
residential and rural users increased their share of total sales by 14.2
percent but increased their contribution to total revenues by only 2.5
percent. During the same period, industrial users decreased their share
134. Cudahy and Malko, LRIC proponents, suggest that historical cost analysis
sufficiently resembles the analysis used in the financial world to determine whether
commission approved revenues will meet "requirements for maintaining financial integ-
rity and attracting capital." Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing: Madison
Gas and Beyond, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 47, 59. This they suggest is a "plausible" argument
for retaining historical cost pricing. In fact, this argument does not militate against the
revenue-constrained LRIC proposal since the revenue constraint is imposed to ensure
the utility will receive revenues equal to those historical cost analysis would permit. In
addition, the authors indicate their approval for revenue constrained LRIC pricing. Id. at
61. Thus, this discussion of the need for financial integrity and attracting investment
would appear to be raising the same sort of revenue instability concerns suggested in the
text.
135. MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITIES MANUAL a18 (1976).
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of use by 17.3 percent but their contribution to total revenues de-
creased by only 2.9 percent. 136
The apparent justification for a difference in average charge per
kilowatt-hour lies in that fact that industrial users require a greater total
quantity of electricity, in relatively consistent amounts throughout the
year. By contrast, residential customers sometimes require great
amounts of electricity, but not often. Therefore, industrial customers
bear a relatively high proportion of the charges to cover energy-related
costs, but residential customers pay the higher proportion of charges
for demand-related costs. 137 Also, the utility delivers electricity to
136. Id. The following provides a more detailed view of these trends:
PERCENT OF SALES AND REVENUES BY CUSTOMER CLASSES AND YEARS
Residential & Rural Commercial Industrial
%7 %7 %1 %7 %7 %
Total Total Total Total Total Total
Year Sales Revenues Sales Revenues Sales Revenues
Id.
137. The Cost Allocation Manual presents two examples of cost-of-service alloca-
tions by customer class. COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, supra note 13, at 113-15, 118-19,
123-24. The percentage relationships for various factors bear out the generalization in
text:
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL PURCHASES AND CONTRIBUTION TO
COST BY RESIDENTIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMER CLASSES
Southern California New York State
Edison Company Electric & Gas
Corp.
Large & Very Large General
Domestic Large Power Residential Service
Kilowatt-hours purchased 28.8% 46.4% 32.2% 33.6%
Revenues paid 39.5 29.0 46.1 22.4
Fuel expenses paid 28.8 46.4 35.8* 30.8*
Contribution to return
on rate base 36.8 26.4 40.6 17.7
Id. at 118-19, 124.
* This is the share of total operating production expenses that must be largely fuel.
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residential and commercial customers through a distribution system
that is expensive to own and operate, but it delivers electricity to large
industrial customers directly from the transmission system. 13 8 Further,
the largest group of customers is residential-88.7 percent of all
customers were residential in 1975, 82.6 percent in 1945139-and,
therefore, residential customers account for the bulk of the charge for
customer-related costs. In light of all this, it is not surprising that
residential customers pay a higher rate per kilowatt-hour than industri-
al customers.
One can only speculate about causes for the narrowing of the gap.
Perhaps the significance of these differences among customer groups is
less marked than it once was. Perhaps political considerations have
induced commissions to tilt an advantage in favor of residential cus-
tomers. Or, perhaps commissions are gradually correcting an historic-
al, inequitable overcharge of residential customers.
Regardless of their propriety, 14 these relationships between the
quantity purchased and amount contributed to total revenue presently
exist. Individual customers have based their investment decisions
partially on the assumption that these relationships will remain gener-
ally constant, and that commissions will seek to avoid an abrupt
change that unpredictably raises (or lowers) some customers' bills. 141
Recognizing that, commissions attempt to conform to the customer
assumption. Of course, introducing LRIC pricing runs counter to that
goal, since a commission would impose it for the very purpose of
changing customer use patterns and, thereby, the nature of their invest-
ment in energy consuming goods. But given that LRIC pricing requires
that every type of customer will pay the same peak and off-peak price,
the question remains whether an alternative is available that would
attain the advantages of LRIC pricing without risking abrupt and
substantial reallocation of the share of revenues contributed by each
customer group and the resulting income redistribution. If such an
138. The Cost Allocation Manual does not separate information about share of
the rate base invested in distribution equipment. It does show in the California example,
however, that 64.4% of the operating expenses of the distribution system were charged
to Domestic customers as opposed to 6.8% charged to the Large and Very Large Power
customers together. Id. at 119. And, it shows 57.7% of the distribution operating costs
were charged Residential customers in the New York case, while 19.2% were charged
Large General Service customers. Id. at 124.
139. MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITIES MANUAL a19 (1976).
140. To maintain perspective, one should recognize that this article addresses these
relationships only as they apply to the benefits of LRIC and peak-load pricing. While I
suspect that the relationships are skewed unfavorably against residential customers, that
is for reasons unrelated to LRIC and peak-load pricing reform.
141. See J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 333-34 (1961).
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alternative is available, then this disadvantage of LRIC pricing-the
elimination of the customer-group distinction and attendant income
redistribution not founded on any social policy justification--can be
avoided.1 42
3. Inconsistency With Theoretical "Marginal Cost" Justification
The third disadvantage of LRIC pricing arises from the admitted
necessity for deviation from the theoretical basis of marginal cost
pricing.143 We have accepted the necessity for the LRIC variant be-
cause of the impracticality of the pure short-run marginal cost pricing
142. Consider these relationships as presented in two Portland General Electric
Company rate cases. Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Case No. UF 3157, Order No. 75-832,
at ch. C (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Sept. 26, 1975); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Case No.
UF 3218, Order No. 76-601, at App. F (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Sept. 1, 1976):
Customer Classes
Small Large
Residential Commercial Industrial Industrial
Share of KWH purchased
Year ending 12/31/75 ........ 43.4% 23.0% 10.9% 20.2%
Share of revenues paid
before rate increase
Year ending 12131/75 ........ 50.1 26.8 7.9 10.3
Share of revenues indicated
by LRIC pricing
Year ending 12/31/75 ........ 57.4 19.8 7.6 12.2
Share of revenues charged
as result of rate in-
crease allowed
Year ending 12/31/75 ........ 52.9 23.6 7.3 11.7
Share of KWH purchased
Year ending 6/30/77
(projected) ..................... 42.6 25.8 10.0 20.1
Share of revenues charged
as result of rate increase
allowed
Year ending 6/30/77
(projected) ..................... 52.3 25.3 7.2 12.5
Therefore, in the Portland General Electric Company's service area, Residential and
Large Industrial consumers are being required to pay an increasing proportion of the
Utility's total revenues under the modified form of LRIC pricing imposed by that
Commissioner, even though their share of kilowatt-hours purchased is constant or
declining. Further discussion of his LRIC pricing variation appears in note 169 infra.
143. As already noted, under marginal cost pricing and optimal market conditions,
sellers price their goods at the cost of producing the next unit of output. This pricing
signals to the buyer the best allocation of scarce resources and enables the seller to
receive the full cost of each buyer's purchase. See text accompanying notes 58-59
supra.
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approach.144 And, we have seen general agreement that LRIC rates, if
adopted, must be constrained by historical cost revenues.145 But, does
the LRIC variation constrained by historical cost revenue change the
prices charged so much from the marginal cost ideal that the advan-
tages of marginal cost pricing are not achieved? Providing the seller
with sufficient revenue to cover the cost of manufacturing the next unit
is one such advantage. While revenue constrained LRIC pricing may
cover more of that cost for each unit sold than does historical cost
pricing, the averaging aspect of "incremental" pricing and the impact
of the constraint of historical cost total revenue 146 make it impossible
for LRIC pricing to ensure that the whole cost of each unit of service is
covered by the price for that unit. 147
The other advantage of marginal cost pricing is that it enables the
purchaser to compare the worth of the goods or services he or she buys
with those of other possible purchases. 148 However, this advantage
arises only if other goods and services are also priced on the margin-a
dubious proposition. Therefore, the question remains whether
economic efficiency is enhanced by pricing electricity at revenue-
constrained LRIC levels given a world in which other goods and
services are not priced at the margin. Professor Kahn finds no reason to
believe that it should.14 Professor Markovits concurs, contending that
it depends on individual cases.150
4. Expanded Regulatory Intrusion
LRIC pricing's remaining disadvantages present noneconomic is-
sues. For example, LRIC's fourth disadvantage relates to its impact on
144. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 84-93 supra and accompanying text.
146. Assuming that a given utility faces increasing costs, the constraint will require
the reduction of LRIC based rates for some units, further jeopardizing the assurance that
the price of each unit covers its full cost.
147. See text accompanying notes 63-64 & 93 supra.
148. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
149. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 119, at 69-70 n.17 (citing Lipsey & Lancaster, The
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956), and discussions of that
classical article. "Theory of the second best" is the name given this area of discussion in
the economic literature).
150. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-
Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to
the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 950, 969, 974-75, 976. Professor
Markovits would appear to challenge the LRIC pricing proposal, because it does not
contain policy judgments regarding income distribution effects of rates, id. at 983. See
C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 393 '(Rev. ed. 1969): "Since it is unlikely
that marginal cost pricing will be adopted by all industries its adoption for the regulated
industries is difficult to justify."
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commission-utility relations. LRIC pricing requires that commissions
look more deeply into the affairs of utilities than many commissions
have in the past. Under LRIC pricing, the decision-maker must deter-
mine the ways in which utilities are growing-the changes emerging in
amounts and patterns of usage, the new markets to be cultivated and
the old to be curtailed, the kinds and amounts of construction neces-
sary, and so on. Such judgments certainly are not as necessary to
historical cost ratemaking, and traditionally utilities have exercised a
relatively free hand in this area. 151 While some question the wisdom of
leaving such discretion to utilities, 152 privately-owned utilities require,
by definition, that management maintain some prerogatives.1 53 In any
event, LRIC ratemaking presents two alternatives: either commissions
must intrude more into areas that have been traditionally left to man-
agement, or they must accept decisions of management in these mat-
ters, leaving to themselves only the ministerial task of applying the
LRIC analysis to facts predetermined in utility board rooms. Since
statutory mandates require commissions to exercise some amount of
discretion, the latter course is unacceptable. Therefore, under LRIC
pricing, the only course left to commissions is to intrude into more
utility management decision areas.
5. Administrative Impracticality
Additional administrative difficulties resulting from a decision to
shift to LRIC ratemaking is the fifth disadvantage to such a course of
action. 154 For all of its problems, historical cost analysis presents a
relatively straightforward accounting task, largely based on collecting
information about actual costs. 155 By contrast, LRIC analysis requires
151. See R. CAYWOOD, supra note 129, at 207-10; 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY
REGULATION 342-43 (1969). Both authors emphasize the dominant role that utility man-
agement traditionally plays in designing rate structures.
152. See, e.g., E. BERLIN, C. CICCHETrI & W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVES ON POWER, at
xxiii, 91 (1974).
153. See 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 151, at 23.
154. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 134, at 59 (historical cost pricing recommended as
"administratively simple").
155. This is especially true of jurisdictions which use an original cost rate base. 1 A.
PRIEST, supra note 151, at 139-40. Indeed, while Missouri law requires its commission to
consider a fair value rate base, State ex rel. Dyer v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341
S.W.2d 795, 799, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961), that state's commission typically
receives testimony and then makes its decision on both net original cost and fair value
rate bases. See, e.g., Re Union Elec. Co., 81 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 265, 270-71 (Mo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1969).
In 1969, Priest listed 30 states and the District of Columbia as "original cost"
jurisdictions and 20 that are "fair value," stating that the latter are "probably more
significant commercially than their original cost sisters." 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 151, at
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some heady prognostications, including projecting growth in consumer
demand, estimating cost changes for construction and operation, and
collecting of time-of-use data on an hourly or similar basis. 156 Histori-
cal cost analysis presents certain problems in times of severe economic
readjustment, such as periods of double-digit inflation, when correla-
tions between last year's expenses and next year's costs deteriorate.
On the other hand, the cost of gathering information on which to base
marginal cost studies is indeterminate and perhaps very large, 157 and
142-66. A more recent survey and compilation, published by the Council of State
Governments, indicated that seven states had moved into the original cost camp by
1974-Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New York, and Ohio. Mississippi
had adopted a combination of fair value and prudent investment rate bases. North
Dakota had adopted the prudent investment rate base. Washington permitted "[a]ny
method or combination warranted by law." A. FINDER, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC
UTILITY REGULATION 26-27 (1977). Because the case law is not always clear on the
subject, it may be that these states have not changed standards. Rather, those standards
may now be interpreted differently. Using Finder's conclusions, which put California,
Illinois, New York, Ohio, and others in the original cost column, it is doubtful that
Priest's conclusion about commercial significance holds today.
156. In the New York commission proceeding to determine whether New York would
require the electric utilities in its jurisdiction to base rates on marginal cost, it was
maintained that "[tjhe calculation of marginal costs . . . is horrendously complex and
the definitions arbitrary, as demonstrated by the fact that numerous experts disagree
about the costs properly included and the method of doing so." Re Rate Design for Elec.
Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434, 444 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). The
commission was not impressed with the argument. Id. at 450-51.
Professor Phillips pointed out that LRIC calculations are complicated by the fact that
"long-run marginal costs are usually indeterminate" because of uncertainties about
future costs. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 150, at 14. Further, he noted that short-run and
long-run costs are difficult to distinguish. Also, the utility may have adequate capacity to
perform one part of its activities-for example, to distribute additional electricity pur-
chases-but not another-for example, to generate additional electricity. On the other
hand, Professor Vickrey contended that an optimum historical cost-based rate structure
may be more difficult to compute than marginal cost rates. Vickrey, Some Objections to
Marginal--Cost Pricing, 56 J. POLITICAL ECON. 218, 230-32 (1948).
157. Consider, for example, the disclaimer that Professors Cicchetti, Gillen, and
Smolensky found necessary to include in their introduction to the three case studies of
marginal cost pricing they conducted:
Each of the cases purports to be a realistic representation of the marginal
cost structure of that system. However, some of the data were necessarily only
the "best guess" of the true value of certain variables. In many cases, such
informed estimates are regularly employed by utility engineers in planning and
operating a system, the cost of better information not being worth the price. In
all the cases studied here, the utility engineers agreed that their estimates were
reasonable and that the likely magnitude of error would not significantly distort
the analysis ....
Whether such an investment [to obtain more precise figures] would be
worthwhile is a matter of judgment, and none of the utilities can give assurance
that the quality of the estimated data is adequate for certain purposes, for
example, the design of tariffs actually to be placed in effect by regulatory
commissions in the service area served by them.
C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, THE MARGINAL COST AND PRICING OF
ELECTRICITY: AN APPLIED APPROACH 37-38 (1977) (emphasis original).
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the cost of installing time-of-use meters at all customer locations is
substantial. 158 For many years, ratemaking experts have preferred
historical cost pricing because it allows them to base decisions on
evidence about past experience which it is thought more accurately
predicts future experience than does conjecture about the changes that
may occur. 159
The problem of basing decisions on opinions about the future, as
LRIC pricing requires, is exacerbated by the fact that commissions'
judgments about future occurrences depend largely on the beliefs of
utilities' managements. For example, when reviewing the marginal
cost study presentations of utilities, commission staffs would have to
change their line of questioning from "How much did a carload of coal
cost the utility last year?" to "Do you think you will be able to
negotiate a similar price next year?" The obvious, and understand-
able, instincts of self-preservation will encourage management to err in
its predictions, if at all, on the side of rising costs and declining
revenues. 160
In addition, a priori, task is more difficult to manage than historic-
al cost analysis. The proposal requires commissions (1) to estimae
158. Comment, 6 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,221, 10,223 (1976). Technology for this metering
is rapidly evolving. See, e.g., C. CICCHETI, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note
157, at 195-215; Mann, Rate Structure Alternatives for Electricity, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT.
No. 2, at 29, 33-34 (1977); Miller & Gerber, The Technology for Load Management Rate
Structures, 97 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 12, at 41 (1976). The technology has existed for
years and is installed for many of the large industrial users. The question is whether the
investment required exceeds the benefits that would be gained by putting residential and
other customers on time-of-day rate schedules. Obviously, technological improvements
reducing the cost of these meters enhances the attractiveness of such rate structures.
159. Professor Priest, an avowed advocate of utilities' interests (I A. PIEST, supra
note 151, at ix, 38), sees precision in a system that uses as the test year a 12-month period
completed either when the commission takes testimony or at some point during the
course of the commission's deliberations:
In substantially all formal rate proceedings, relevant data covering a "test
period" of one year are examined. If that period comprises the most recent
twelve months for which information is available, gross revenues will be taken
directly from the company's books. If six months of actual and six months of
projected earnings are combined for test purposes, the figures for gross reve-
nues should be substantially accurate. They will, in any event, be subject to
precise revision before the regulatory agency makes its findings.
Id. at 45. Of course, it must be recognized that those words were written before the high
inflation rates of the early 1970's and the concomitant push by utilities to adopt the
"future" test year. See note 10 supra.
160. For example, consider the debated but widely respected hypothesis that reg-
ulated firms tend to over invest. This is referred to variously as the Averch-Johnson and
the A-J-W effect. See Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline
Companies: An Economic Analysis, 71 J. POLITICAL ECON. 30 (1963). See also 2 A.
KAHN, supra note 119, at 49-59; C. PHILLIPS, supra note 150, at 723-25.
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LRIC, (2) to estimate historical cost, and then (3) to adjust LRIC rates
to obtain revenues equal to those permitted by historical cost. Thus,
historical cost analysis is a subcategory of the proposed analysis.
The foregoing observations do not prove that LRIC is too difficult
to administer, although those concerned that commissions are insuffi-
ciently equipped to handle the task already assigned them may infer
just that. 161 These observations do, however, point to the fact that
adoption of LRIC pricing requires commissions to take some risks with
the quality of information upon which they base their decisions-risks
that can be avoided with historical cost pricing. Nevertheless, some
experts have tried to prove LRIC pricing is manageable.162
6. Political Unpalatability
The remaining disadvantage worthy of note is the political opposi-
tion to LRIC prices that has arisen among both utility and consumer
advocates who understand the proposal reasonably well. Utility repre-
sentatives worry that commissions will not raise rates sufficiently to
meet historical cost revenue requirements for decreasing cost
utilities. 63 At the same time some consumer advocates doubt that
commissions will effectively squeeze out all "excess profits" that
unsuccessfully constrained increasing cost utilities would obtain. 164
The risks perceived by each seems real.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO LRIC RATEMAKING:, PEAK-LOAD PRICING
BASED ON COST-OF-SERVICE ALLOCATIONS
The disadvantages of LRIC pricing suggest that its adoption will
not necessarily produce the results desired, and that its practical and
theoretical deficiencies may make its implementation difficult or im-
possible. At the same time, however, present trends and patterns of
electricity consumption have helped create rising quantity of electricity
161. See, e.g., Lewis, Emphasis and Misemphasis in Regulatory Policy, in UTILITY
REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND POLICY 245 (W. Shepherd & T. Gies eds.
1967).
162. See C. CICCHETri, W. GILLEN & P. SMOLENSKY, supra note 157.
163. See, e.g., Re The Hartford Elec. Light Co., 6 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 209,
225-26 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974). Professor Vickrey criticized the tendency to
place undue weight upon both this argument and the argument that utility managements
will lose their independence if commissions price at the margin and subsidize those
utilities facing decreasing costs to make up revenue deficiencies. Vickrey, Pricing in
Transportation and Public Utilities: Some Implications of Marginal Cost Pricing for
Public Utilities, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 605, 608-09 (1955).
164. The concern of consumer intervenors that an LRIC-priced utility in the increas-
ing cost situation would obtain revenues that are too great was discussed in Re Madison
Gas & Elec. Co., 5 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 28, 37 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
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demanded with rising rates, and yet declining load factors. For this
reason alternative reforms must be sought which, like LRIC pricing,
promise to slow or reverse these trends, but do not incur LRIC
pricing's substantial disadvantages.
A. The Proposal
I propose that commissions (1) continue to determine permissible
total revenues by historical cost analysis and (2) introduce to existing
rate structures different charges, depending on whether purchases
occur during periods of peak or off-peak demand. 165 We can ascertain
how great to make these rate differences by an essentially noncost
method or by one which predominantly rests on cost issues. Further,
the proposal allows a commission to choose between retaining or
eliminating customer groupings. For reasons that become clearer be-
low, I believe we should adopt the predominantly cost approach and
retain customer groupings.
In essence, this proposal calls for adopting peak-load pricing based
on cost-of-service allocations. For those who think of peak-load pric-
ing as "a popular name surrogate for marginal cost pricing," 166 the
proposal is incomprehensible. 167 But, peak-load pricing and marginal
165. Others have propounded variations of the same suggestion. For example, the
Michigan commission, although not clear about whether it intended to introduce peak-
load pricing in that state's utilities, was clear that it could do so within the traditional
cost-of-service allocation process and that it would not adopt LRIC as a pricing tech-
nique:
Based upon the available evidence the commission finds that conventional cost-
of-service data . . . provide a rational basis for reasonable allocation of cost
responsibility between customer classes and lend themselves in a straight-
forward manner to determination of on-peak costs and off-peak costs. The use
of conventional cost-of-service procedures in the context of current revenue
requirement determinations and a time-of-day pricing mode is fully consistent
with the important objective of providing correct price signals to consumers
which are in accord with economic efficiency criteria.
It also appears that the use of long run incremental cost (LRIC) is not
appropriate for electric rate design in Michigan. . . .As an actual pricing
mechanism . . . . it is not consistent with revenue constraints that must be
imposed under monopoly pricing to ensure that the consumer is treated in a
reasonable and equitable manner.
Re Consumers Power Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 370, 401-02 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976). The idea has also appeared in industry literature. See, e.g., Grainger, 4
Practical Approach to Peak-Load Pricing, 98 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 6, at 19 (1976);
Sherry, Cutting the Marginalists' Gordian Knot, 99 PuB. UTIL. FORT, No. 4, at 21 (1977).
166. The Environmental Law Reporter editors used those words to describe peak-
load pricing. Comment, [1976] 6 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELI) 10,221.
167. See Note, Lexonomics and the Electrical Utility Industry: In Search of the
Optimal Rate Structure, 61 IowA L. REV. 134 (1975): "Peak-load pricing is. . .inherent
in the incremental cost formula because it is theoretically based on a close tracking of
LRIC." Id. at 165 (footnotes omitted). See Renshaw, The Pricing of Electricity, 97 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., No. 1, at 28 (1976).
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cost pricing are not identical. 168 The application of any marginal-cost-
analysis variant does indeed imply peak-load pricing since the margin-
al cost of service during periods of peak demand includes the bulk of
the capital costs for expanding capacity. 169 However, the peak/off-
168. See Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Reform: Taxation
Through Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1084, 1090 (1970); Morton, Long-Run Incre-
mental Costs and the Pricing of Electricity, Part I, 97 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 6, at 34, 35
(1976); Treadway, Congress and Electric Rate Design, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT., No. 9, at 11
(1977); Walters, The Great Rate Debate, 98 PUB. UTIL. FORT., 17 (No. 13, Dec. 16, 1976).
169. See notes 55-64 supra and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Oregon
Commissioner has made use of LRIC pricing without introducing peak-load pricing.
Under his method, the utility conducts an LRIC study to ascertain the total long-run
incremental costs incurred for the total annual purchases of each group of customers.
For utilities subject to orders applying this technique, revenues based upon LRIC would
exceed those yielded under historical cost analysis. The Commissioner therefore re-
duced the amount charged each class by approximately equal percentages. See, e.g., Re
Pacific Power & Light Co., Case No. UF 3232, Order No. 76-885, at 10-12 (Ore. Pub.
Util. Comm'r, Dec. 17,1976); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Case No. UF 3218, Order No.
76-601, at 22-25, 28 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r, Sept. 1, 1976); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co.,
Case No. UF 3257, Order No.75-842, at 19-29 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r, Sept. 26, 1975);
Re Pacific Power & Light Co., Case No. UF 3150, Order No. 75-704, at 13-18 (Ore. Pub.
Util. Comm'r, Aug. 13, 1975); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH
393, 414-18 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1974), aff'd sub nom., Publishers Paper Co. v.
Davis, 28 Ore. App. 189, 559 P.2d 891 (1977). He justified the equal percentage adjust-
ment from LRIC to historical cost totals on the grounds that the inverse elasticity rule is
the only justifiable basis upon which to vary from LRIC, see notes 96-98 supra and
accompanying text, and that applying equal percentage adjustments is the best approxi-
mation available for implementing that rule:
[T]he equal percentage of LRIC method is a direct application of the inverse
elasticity rule. All parties agree that no clear evidence exists to suggest other
than equal elasticities among PGE's major customer classes. Under this situa-
tion, no economic justification exists for charging different percentages of
LRIC to customer classes; hence the application of equal percentages of LRIC.
Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Case No. UF 3157, Order No. 75-832, at 27 (Ore. Pub. Util.
Comm'r, Sept. 26, 1975). See also Re Pacific Power & Light Co., Case No. 3150, Order
No. 75-704, at 17 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r, Aug. 13, 1975). He justified varying the
percentage adjustments from being exactly equal, however, on the grounds that "the
commissioner must also recognize the desirability of minimizing abrupt changes in cost
responsibility to the different customer classes." Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 PUB. U.
REP. (PUR) 4TH 393, 417 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1974), aff'd sub nom. Publishers
Paper Co. v. Davis, 28 Ore. App. 189, 559 P.2d 891 (1977).
The Commissioner's reasoning is disturbing: not only does he offer no rationale for
his conclusion that elasticities are substantially equal, he also ignores other potentially
acceptable devices available to vary revenues from those dictated by LRIC analysis. See
notes 99-107 supra and accompanying text. Further, the Commissioner has not even
required the winter/summer price variation of peak-load pricing. E.g., Re Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., Case No. UF 3218, Order 76-601, at 30 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r, Sept. 1,
1976). Therefore, his application of LRIC theory does not portend the achievement of
many of the benefits implicit in LRIC analysis implemented through peak-load pricing.
The only real effect of this technique is the redistribution of a share of the total revenues
paid by all customer groups, and the commissioner offers no argument to support that
result.
The Pennsylvania commission also introduced LRIC pricing concepts in a manner
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peak price distinction is not restricted to marginal cost pricing; it may
be applied under historical cost, marginal cost, or any other analy-
sis. 170 Further, the advantages flowing from LRIC pricing--control-
that only remotely relates to peak-load pricing, but its approach seems more likely than
the Oregon approach to obtain some of the benefits associated with peak-load pricing
based on LRIC analysis. See Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 4 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 209, (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1974). There, the commis-
sion allowed the company to raise rates to estimated LRIC levels for "price sensitive"
categories of service. For example, it allowed above average increases for water heat
and for residential customers' high monthly use ("tail blocks") which it assumed reflect-
ed space heating and air conditioning use. Id. at 240-41. In addition, the commission
continued summer/winter rate distinctions for general residential service and extended
those distinctions to cover all electric homes. These changes reflect an early start toward
LRIC pricing, but not a pervasive effort to apply it without relatively precise peak-load
pricing.
170. Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 434, 440 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). See President Carter's statements in his April 20, 1977 speech
to a Joint Session of Congress, 123 CONG. REC. H3328, H3329 (daily ed., April 20,
1977), and his published energy plan, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NA-
TIONAL ENERGY PLAN 46 (1977) as well as ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD
FOUNDATION, A TIME To CHOOSE 257-60, 340 (1974). None of these statements specify
whether President Carter or the Ford Foundation assume that time-of-day prices must
rest on LRIC analysis. One would not expect such sources to withhold all allusions to
LRIC pricing, however, if they thought it is necessary for time related pricing. The
House of Representatives also did not expressly state that it intended the bill it adopted
August 5, 1977, to require that commissions adopt LRIC pricing. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess., § 532(a)(2) (1977) states:
Such methods [for determining cost of service] shall. . . reflect differences
in cost-incurrence, for each electric consumer (or class thereof), attributable to
daily and seasonal time of use of service. In prescribing such methods, there
shall be taken into account the extent to which total costs to an electric utility
are likely to change if-
(A) capacity is added to meet peak demand relative to base demand, and
(B) additional kilowatt-hours of electric energy are delivered to electric
consumers.
123 CONG. REC. H8421 (daily ed., Aug. 3, 1977). A colloquy among Representatives
Moffet, Steiger, and Dingell (the latter being a chief supporter of increased federal
involvement in retail electric rate regulation) indicates that the committee intended that
marginal cost pricing should be examined but that commissions should not be required to
adopt that technique of ratemaking. Representative Dingell concluded, "it is not the
intention or plan that marginal pricing practices are required by this bill to be the only
ones considered. That would be wrong." Id. at H8434. Congress did, however, state a
presumption favoring time-of-day, peak-load pricing. H.R. 8444,95th Cong., 1st Sess., §
511(a)(2)(A), 123 CONG. REc. H8419 (daily ed., Aug. 3, 1977).
Several state commissions have likewise recognized the possibility of implementing
peak-load pricing without LRIC analysis. The Michigan commission did so explicitly,
stating that cost differences between peak and off-peak use could be reflected in
historical cost ratemaking and that LRIC pricing "is not appropriate for electric rate
design in Michigan." Re Consumers Power Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 370, 402
(Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). See note 165 supra. Other state commissions have
done so implicitly by endorsing peak-load pricing while rejecting or not adverting to
LRIC analysis. See Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 11 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 215,
232-36 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975) (refused to adopt LRIC analysis without more
information, but directed the utility to create an optional peak-load pricing rate struc-
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ling rate of growth in quantity demanded, helping ensure market
willingness to cover capital expansion costs, and improving load
factors-derive from the fact that LRIC pricing necessitates peak-load
pricing. Any formula that includes peak-load pricing, in order to take
advantage of customers' price/demand sensitivity, 171 will tend to ob-
tain those same advantages, and will differ only to the extent that the
peak and off-peak rates differ from those dictated by LRIC pricing. 172
B. Implementing the Proposal
Since historical cost analysis is not a novel idea, we can focus
attention on the second element of my proposal, namely, introducing a
peak/off-peak price distinction into cost-of-service allocations. This
may be achieved either by an essentially noncost-or by a predominant-
ly cost-based method. Although the noncost method might take numer-
ous forms, perhaps the most logical one would entail three steps. The
ture); Re Tampa Elec. Co., 9 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 402,424 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975) (without extensive analysis or reference to LRIC pricing, the commission ordered
the utility to adopt an optional, nonresidential peak-load pricing rate schedule); Re
Florida Power & Light Co., 9 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 146, 171-72 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975); cf. Re Northern States Power Co., 11 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 385,
414-15 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975) (the commission rejected time-of-day pricing,
applied a seasonal rate distinction as a partial step toward peak-load pricing, and
reserved the area for further study). In Re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Application No.
56124, Dec. No. 86632, at 21, 22-23 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Nov. 16, 1976), the
California commission refused one party's invitation to decide whether it would adopt
marginal cost principles for ratemaking but simultaneously approved a peak/off-peak
rate differential for some customers who had time-of-day metering equipment already
installed. The Maryland commission ordered its large utilities to study marginal cost
pricing and to initiate time-of-day metering experiments, thus indicating its understand-
ing that time-of-day pricing may not require marginal cost analysis. It did this not-
withstanding the dissenting complaint of one commissioner that the commission ought to
adopt marginal cost pricing immediately. Investigation on Comm'n's Own Motion of
Elec. Util. Rate Structures, Case No. 6808, Order No. 62568 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Sept. 7, 1977).
171. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
172. Professor Huntington's article does not consider whether peak-load pricing
might be implemented without reference to LRIC pricing. He did recognize, however,
that there must be price elasticity of demand for LRIC pricing to be attractive, and he
suggested that there must also be some quantitative information about those elasticities
for LRIC pricing to be instituted by regulatory commissions' processes. Huntington, The
Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate
Structures, 55 B.U.L. REv. 699, 726-28 (1975). Professor Huntington, therefore, is not
among those who would impose LRIC pricing regardless of its impact on demand for
electricity. On the other hand, he characterizes the Vermont position as supporting
LRIC analysis even though that commission's statements indicate that its aim is to
institute peak-load pricing, not marginal cost theory. Id. at 757. See Re Central Vt. Pub.
Serv. Corp., 7 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 67, 83-86 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1974). Aman and
Howard also recognized (but did not develop) the distinction between marginal cost
theory and peak-load pricing. Aman & Howard, supra note 154, at 1090.
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commission selecting this method would (1) set a goal for the extent to
which it seeks to have customers' patterns of use change, (2) ascertain
the utility customers' price/demand elasticities, and (3) impose price
differences which, given those elasticities, will best attain the goal for
change in usage patterns.
Unfortunately, inadequate knowledge of price elasticities makes
the practicality of this entire method suspect. 173 To modify it, the
commission might (1) still follow the first step, but (2) guess the
customers' price/demand senstitivies based on the most informed judg-
ment feasible, (3) impose price differences that, based on those gues-
ses, seem most likely to attain the sought for change in usage patterns,
and (4) subsequently modify the price differences as experience shows
which best induce the usage pattern change sought. Since both varia-
tions rely on a decision regarding preferable usage patterns as a matter
of public policy, this approach may be characterized as essentially
noncost.
The predominantly cost-based method introduces a refinement into
the cost-of-service allocation process by distinguishing costs as-
sociated with purchases during peak periods from other purchases. It is
difficult to determine in the abstract precisely how to introduce this
refinement, for selecting an appropriate allocation formula requires the
exercise of judgment in light of actual circumstances. For illustrative
purposes we can hypothesize some variations.
Consider refining the cost classifications in the third step of the
process by creating five classifications instead of three: peak and off-
peak energy-related costs; customer-related costs; and peak and off-
peak demand-related costs.174 Dividing energy-related costs between
peak and off-peak services would present little problem since these
costs vary in proportion to variations in quantity of production. Cus-
tomer-related costs, based as they are upon the total number of utility
customers, do not vary according to customers' peak and off-peak
demand and, therefore, need not be divided.
Demand-related costs would be divided between peak and off-peak
purchases according to an allocation formula similar to those used in
the step dividing costs among customer groups since demand-related
costs-generating equipment, and transmission lines, and so forth-
are joint costs between peak and off-peak use as well as among
customer groups. 175
173. See note 114 supra.
174. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
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The allocation formula selected has a direct bearing on the degree
of difference between peak and off-peak prices per kilowatt-hour sold.
For example, a technique analogous to the peak responsibility
method 176 might require that only those purchases made during peak-
demand periods should include demand-related costs. Or, using a
technique analogous to the average-and excess-demand method, 77
one might distinguish between those demand-related costs that the
utility incurs in order to serve customers the average amount of
electricity they purchase, and those it incurs to provide electricity in
excess of that amount during periods of higher demand. The demand-
related costs incurred in connection with average purchases would be
allocated on the basis of kilowatt-hours sold without regard to whether
the sale was peak or off-peak. The remaining demand-related costs
would be charged to the peak class. By apportioning all demand-
related costs to peak period purchases, the first of these alternatives
would impose a greater distinction between peak and off-peak rates
than the second.
Arguably, the allocation of demand-related costs in this step pro-
vides a sufficient basis for designing a peak-load pricing structure.17 8 If
for the sake of argument we assume that time-of-day meters could be at
each customer location, 179 we would be able to ascertain information
about the amount of use and the time of use during each billing period
for each customer. Such information is all that is needed to allocate
among customers energy-related costs (based on the total number of
kilowatt-hours purchased), demand-related costs (based upon number
of kilowatt-hours purchased during peak and off-peak periods), and
customer-related costs (allocated according to the total number of
customers). Doing so would eliminate the need for the fourth step in
176. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
178. In fact, for at least one reason not discussed in the text, a suggestion to eliminate
.customer group allocations may not be possible during the late 1970's. The reason is that
utilities cannot instantaneously install time-of-day meters. Thus, a residium of customers
who are not time-of-day metered must (for some time at least) be billed under monthly
use rate schedules built on the traditional cost-of-service allocations. To develop a rate
structure for billing them without such metering, allocating among customer groups is
required. Further, the technology for time-of-day metering is in developmental stages.
As of 1977, there exist accurate, but expensive time-of-day meters, although the technol-
ogy for less expensive meters seems to be moving ahead rapidly. Thus, the limitations of
present technology (tempered by the hope for near future improvements) may suggest
the strategy of installing time-of-day meters immediately only for those customers most
likely to respond positively to peak-load pricing, and leaving universal installation to
await technological developments. See Teed, A Practitioner Looks at Peak Load Pric-
ing, 97 PuB. UrIL. FORT., No. 3, at 26 (1976).
179. See notes 158 & 178 supra.
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the allocation process, that is, allocating among residential, industrial,
commercial, and other minor customer groups, a step presently neces-
sitated by the inability to meter each customer on a time-of-day basis.
However, as we observed in the discussion of LRIC's disadvan-
tages,180 eliminating the recognition of distinct customer groupings
may impose income redistributions that are not justified by any explicit
social policy.181 Therefore, it seems that the fourth step of the histori-
cal cost allocation process-dividing costs among customer groups-
should be retained and the share of total revenue contributed by each
group should not be abruptly changed. Some customer groups' shares
might increase in order to achieve the peak-load pricing goals if the
customer groups have an exceptionally poor load pattern or if the
demand of those groups is very insensitive to price changes. Either
situation might require such a great difference between peak and off-
peak price that the utility would charge those groups nothing for off-
peak service, or it would charge a rate for peak service that would
make the groups' contributions to total revenues greater than they had
been. If so, these customer groups must pay the higher rate if the utility
is to realize the goal of appropriate growth in the quantity demanded
and improved load factors without giving electricity away.
Except for that unusual case, however, no reason supports
eliminating customer-group allocations since doing so would precipi-
tate rate increases for some customers. On the other hand, the retention
of this allocation step may help customers to avoid overall increases or
even help them to obtain decreased electric bills. Customers who
180. See notes 135-42 supra and accompanying text.
181. Consider, for example, the implication of eliminating the step of allocating
demand-related costs among customer groups for a utility that in the past has allocated
according to the noncoincident demand formula. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
That formula requires users with a relatively smooth load pattern to contribute more to
demand-related costs than they would under the peak responsibility method. Since
industrial users have smoother load patterns than residential users, the industrial cus-
tomers probably would contribute more to total revenues under this method of allocation
than they would under the peak responsibility method-and residential customers con-
tribute less. If we eliminate allocations among customer groups, we may anticipate that
residential customers will continue to use more peak period service (relative to average
service) than industrial users. Since peak-load pricing necessarily requires a greater
proportion of revenues to come from peak use, these residential customers will probably
experience an overall rate increase. This scenario might not occur for all utilities.
Further, considering the commercial customers and other minor customer groups, more
than one group may experience net increases or decreases in their required contribution
to total revenue. The essential point is that eliminating the fourth step of the allocation
process-possible though it might be under cost-based peak-load pricing-will likely
cause some customer group or groups to experience a net rate increase.
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object to high rates can save by shifting their electricity purchases to
off-peak periods. If we eliminate the customer-group-allocation step,
members of those customer groups that experience net rate increases
will have to be even more price sensitive in order to avoid increased
electric bills.
To summarize, the cost and noncost methods for allocating charges
between peak and off-peak use constitute two alternative approaches
for introducing peak-load pricing without adopting LRIC analysis.
Drawing upon this discussion of those two approaches and upon the
earlier discussion of LRIC pricing subject to a historical cost revenue
constraint, we can now compare the potential advantages of each.
VII. COMPARING THE COST-OF-SERVICE BASED PEAK-LOAD PRICING
AND REVENUE-CONSTRAINED LRIC PRICING ALTERNATIVES
Relying as it does on the selection of allocation methods for
dividing the joint costs of production among several time periods, the
peak-load pricing proposal suggests no mechanically applicable
criteria for implementation, and, therefore, if adopted it would
broaden the scope of the commissions' discretion. Thus, in the next
section, we evaluate the breadth of commissions' discretion required to
apply the proposal. We compare that with the discretion necessary to
apply the revenue constrained LRIC pricing proposal. That discussion
indicates that the lack of firm criteria is not sufficient to justify
rejecting the peak-load pricing proposal. In the second section, the
implications of peak-load pricing are compared with LRIC pricing's
advantages and disadvantages, with the conclusion that a peak-load
pricing proposal, as implemented by a predominantly cost method just
discussed, seems preferable.
A. Adequacy of Criteria for Implementing Peak-Load Pricing
We have observed in several steps of the cost-of-service allocation
process that it is not possible to set prices according to the simple
principle that price should equal the cost of producing a particular
service. These steps include selecting an allocation formula to divide
costs among customer groups,1 82 estimating future sales and expan-
sion, 183 and dividing common expenses such as chief-executive
salaries and office space.184 Each of these requires the largely unfet-
tered exercise of judgment by commissions. Adopting peak-load pric-
ing proposal expands the scope of that discretion. Depending on how
182. See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 151-53 supra and accompanying text.
184. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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the proposal is implemented, a commission must either select an
allocation formula to divide costs between peak and off-peak use
(under the cost-based method) or determine what demand growth in
quantity demanded and load factors are desirable as a matter of public
policy (under the noncost method). Either decision entails an exercise
of discretion not previously required. For those who believe that
regulatory reform should tend toward narrowing agency discretion,18 5
this broadened scope of commission discretion might be a serious
disadvantage for the cost-of-service based peak-load pricing proposal.
Assuming that we seek a pricing reform that will have the advan-
tages of controlled growth in the quantity of new capacity demanded,
of revenues that better cover costs of new capacity, and of load factor
improvement, the scope of discretion implicit in cost-of-service based
peak-load pricing is not a serious disadvantage for two reasons. First,
the revenue-constrained LRIC pricing alternative also requires the
exercise of a considerable scope of discretion. Second, the questions to
be left to commissions or other decisionmaking authorities under peak-
load pricing enhance the likelihood that commissions will achieve the
goals of pricing reform without unwanted side effects. It may be that
commissions as presently constituted should not have the power to
exercise that discretion. But, as shown presently, a rate structure that
has these advantages requires broad exercise of discretion by some
lawfully constituted authority. 186
The first reason for concluding that the breadth of discretion in
cost-of-service based peak-load pricing does not pose a serious prob-
lem rests on the fact that its alternative-revenue-constrained LRIC
pricing-also requires the exercise of a broadened scope of discretion,
even though it is true that that exercise of discretion does not require
the selection of an allocation formula to divide demand-related costs
among customer groups.187 For example, LRIC pricing proposals do
185. See, e.g., Kristol, Opinion: A Regulated Society, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1977, at
12.
186. This article does not seek resolution of whether commissions given this broad
area for the exercise of discretion should be modified insitutionally or more directly
incorporated into legislative or executive institutions. See notes 206-09 infra and accom-
panying text. Here, the discussion is of the kind and scope of discretion that must be
exercised if reforms having the advantages of LRIC pricing are adopted. Hereafter I
often refer to "commissions" exercising the rate structuring function, even though I
recognize that that generic reference may be to some institution that differs from the
usual "independent regulatory agency."
187. It does not require such an allocation formula because it does not differentiate
prices according to customer group. Not making that distinction, however, is a disadvan-
tage of the LRIC pricing technique. See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra. Were
the LRIC proposal modified to so divide costs, such division could only be achieved by
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require some division of capital costs between peak and off-peak
service, 188 and since some of the costs of peak and off-peak service are
joint costs, a commission cannot divide them by simply associating a
price with the cost of the particular service.' 89 In addition, LRIC
pricing requires decisions based on estimates of future events and
costs. 190 The very inadequacy of the available information upon which
to base those estimations forces the commissions to use broad discre-
tion in determining rates.
In addition to these factors, the question of how to constrain LRIC
revenue by historical costs also forces commissions to broaden their
exercise of discretion. We noted six methods for constraining LRIC
rates. 191 Among them, the lump-sum and directly proportionate adjust-
ment methods required relatively narrow exercise of discretion but
were among the least effective in utilizing the benefits of LRIC
pricing. The income-redistribution method candidly required a broad
exercise of discretion, and the game-theory approach focused attention
on the probable existence of several different but equally justifiable
solutions for the constraint. Thus, the breadth of commission discre-
tion is not a strong reason for opposing the peak-load pricing proposal
since its LRIC pricing alternative is subject to the same concern.
Besides comparing scope of discretion, we might also examine the
nature of the issues that are left for the exercise of commission
discretion. Under the essentially noncost method for implementing
peak-load pricing, commissions are to make the public policy based
determination of desired growth-in-quantity-demanded and load-factor
levels. Given the current state of the art, such a determination requires
political decisions about the extent to which we wish to encourage
economic expansion and the amount of energy supply growth needed
to sustain that amount of expansion. Those who believe strongly that
commissions should be fairly well insulated from politics would no
doubt prefer a pricing technique that does not require decisions based
upon essentially noneconomic concerns. Since the predominantly cost-
based technique for implementing peak-load pricing does not require
such a decision, this objection does not necessarily preclude the selec-
tion of the peak-load pricing proposal.
Consider, however, the possibility that we prefer that commissions
having commissions exercise the same kind of discretion in selecting a formula as would
be exercised in the cost-of-service allocations.
188. See note 62 supra.
189. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
190. See notes 157-59 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 96-112 supra and accompanying text.
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or some other authority do make these decisions. Since every rate
structure establishes the extent, if any, of the distinction between peak
and off-peak service prices, and since that distinction determines the
extent to which rates will control growth in quantity demanded and
improve load factors, any rate structure chosen implicitly requires this
political decision. Indeed, LRIC proponents argue that controlling
growth in the quantity demanded and improving load factors are
primary benefits of their pricing proposal. Thus, the question becomes
whether we should require commissions or other decisionmaking au-
thorities to make the political decision or whether we should allow the
decision to rest on fate. One answer may be that we should accept
whatever growth-in-quantity-demanded and load-factor levels that
flow from revenue-constrained LRIC pricing or predominantly cost-
based peak-load pricing because it will better allow us to reap the
benefits of marginal cost pricing. However, all the pricing alternatives
depart significantly from pure marginal cost pricing, and, even if
electricity were priced at marginal cost, nothing guarantees efficient
resource allocation since other goods and services are not priced at the
margin. 192 Under the circumstances, the argument that growth-in-
quantity-demanded and load-factor improvement resulting-from selec-
tion of either of those pricing alternatives is the only economically
"correct" choice pales. In fact, if either of the two "less" political of
those two alternatives are selected (LRIC pricing or cost-based peak-
load pricing), I believe that commissions should still decide on the
preferred demand growth and load factors to provide themselves with
guidelines within which to exercise the discretion required in each
alternative. 193
192. See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying text.
193. We should note that commissions' scope of discretion is limited to some degree
as a matter of law. The point is undisputed that commission ratemaking decisions may
not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 497 F.2d 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 158 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.
1946); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 20 1l. 2d 37,42, 169 N.E.2d
268, 271-72 (1960); Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 334 Mass. 477,
489, 136 N.E.2d 243, 251 (1956); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Virginia Elec. & Power
Co., 285 N.C. 398, 411, 206 S.E.2d 283, 293 (1974); Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 42 Ohio St. 2d 403,413,330 N.E.2d 1, 9, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975);
Rhode Island Consumers' Council v. Smith, 111 R.I. 271, 277-78, 302 A.2d 757, 762-63
(1973); Apartment House Council v. Potomac Power Co., 215 Va. 291, 208 S.E.2d 764
(1974). One author has concluded that marginal cost pricing is lawful, Kadane, The
Legality of Marginal Cost Pricing for Utility Services, 5 HOFsTRA L. REv. 755 (1977), and
I have explored that question elsewhere for peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service
analysis, and reached the conclusion that the variations of that proposal-except pos-
sibly for purely noncost approaches--are also lawful. Newburger, The Legality of Some
Electric Utility Rate Structure Proposals: Rate Discrimination Not Justified by Cost
Differences, 27 EMORY L.J. - (1978).
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These considerations lead to the conclusion that the scope of
discretion given commissions under peak-load pricing based on cost-
of-service analysis is not significantly more troublesome than the
scope of that discretion under revenue-constrained LRIC pricing.
Therefore, we are now prepared to take the remaining step of choosing
which of the three alternatives-revenue-constrained LRIC pricing,
peak-load pricing based on essentially noncost decisions, or peak-load
pricing implemented through predominantly cost-based analysis-pro-
vides the best hope for successful electricity rate reform to improve the
rates at which quantity demanded grows, to help ensure market will-
ingness to cover costs of new capacity, and to improve utilities' load
factors.
B. The Superiority of Predominantly Cost-Based Peak-Load Pricing
To reach a conclusion concerning the relative merits of each
proposal, we must compare the alternatives in light of revenue-
constrained LRIC pricing's advantages and disadvantages and then
consider the wisdom of adopting a pricing scheme that is not a strict
application of the principles of microeconomic theory.
1. The Proposal Which Best Achieves the Benefits Sought From
Revenue-Constrained LRIC Pricing
We have examined three benefits of revenue-constrained LRIC
pricing-fostering only that growth in the quantity demanded that, on
the average, makes rates more attractive to customers; helping ensure
market willingness to pay for new facilities; and improving load
factors. 194 We have already noted that the first and third points derive
from the necessarily higher price for peak service and the expectation
that demand is sensitive to price changes. 195 Price sensitivity remains
the same for all proposals, and the alternatives also produce a higher
price for peak service. Thus, all appear capable of providing the first
and third benefits.
At the same time, however, determining which of the proposals
seems most able to secure these benefits depends on how we define the
benefits. If, for example, we define the desired amount of growth in
quantity demanded as that produced by revenue-constrained LRIC
pricing, then obviously LRIC pricing is preferable. But if defined in
purely economic terms, that is, the amount of growth in quantity
demanded that marginal cost pricing with no revenue constraint would
produce, then the revenue-constrained LRIC and the noncost alterna-
194. See notes 100-06 supra and accompanying text.
195. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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tives appear fairly equal. To achieve this goal through LRIC pricing,
one would price at LRIC, then adjust according to the inverse-elastici-
ty rule, lump-sum rule, or game-theory approach, thus achieving the
revenue constraint while retaining customer demand patterns that are
as similar as possible to those produced by that marginal cost pricing.
To achieve that level of growth in quantity demanded through the
essentially noncost alternative, one could simply copy the prices which
the revenue constrained LRIC pricing suggest. However, given that
the constraint methods may not produce exactly the same consumption
pattern as long-run marginal cost pricing, the noncost method can
improve on revenue-constrained LRIC pricing by taking advantage of
its own lack of immutable cost criteria and simply adjusting the
peak/off-peak price distinction to improve the approximation of the
basic goal.
Unfortunately, controlling trends in growth in the quantity de-
manded and improving load factors to the extent indicated by revenue-
constrained LRIC pricing or by long-run marginal cost pricing
comprise a rather narrow range of possible policy goals. One might
also state the growth-in-quantity-demanded goal as that predicted to
produce capacity that best serves national energy management policy,
or that that least increases the average cost of electricity for some
specified time period, or that that guarantees to all a sufficient amount
of electricity to meet the necessities of life, or some combination of
these and others. In this circumstance, the noncost alternative is clearly
superior. By using it, a commission may adjust peak/off-peak differ-
ences to meet whatever of these policy considerations emerge as most
significant.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the predominantly cost alterna-
tive might seem weakest from the point of view of controlling growth
in the quantity demanded and improving load factors. It does not
naturally approximate long-run marginal cost pricing, and it lacks the
open-ended flexibility of the essentially noncost alternative. Yet, I
think it is preferable for several reasons. First, commissions adopting
predominantly the cost-based alternative will probably adopt rates
similar to those that would have been chosen under the other alterna-
tives. Given the revenue constraint and the peak/off-peak difference,
the range of possible variations is not large, and commissions could
exercise their discretion in selecting allocation formulas to make peak-
load prices as similar to those indicated by revenue-constrained LRIC
pricing as they desire. Second, commissions would have greater ability
to determine the size of the peak/off-peak difference than they would
under LRIC pricing, because LRIC's underlying theoretical base re-
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stricts the scope of that choice. 196 By comparison, the cost alternative
affords a commission, which chooses not to confine its policy to that
dictated by marginal cost analysis, greater breadth of choice to imple-
ment those policies. Third, the cost-based method does not suffer a
major drawback of the noncost-the absence of cognizable standards
for its application. The total elimination of cost as a standard creates a
risk that a reviewing court will be unable to ascertain any reasonable
basis for a decision applying the noncost alternative; if so, rates so
constructed would be rejected. 197
Therefore, the cost alternative provides a compromise between the
revenue-constrained LRIC approach and the noncost alternative: it
allows a peak/off-peak rate difference to control growth in quantity
demanded and improve load-factors. It allows greater variation than
LRIC pricing in the degree of the peak/off-peak difference, thus
allowing commissions greater latitude in implementing a range of
policies. And, it builds from a cost analysis, which gives it a concrete
basis for criticism and review.
Analytically, both noncost and cost alternatives seem to ignore the
other benefit of LRIC pricing-the assurance that customers be willing
to pay the cost of providing the additional capacity they demand.
Pragmatically, however, the two alternatives seem as likely to obtain
that benefit as LRIC pricing. Recall that LRIC pricing merely tends
toward ensuring that result, rather than actually doing so, because of
the averaging implicit in the "incremental" unit of measurement. 19 8
Professor Bonbright suggested that long-run marginal cost (which he
196. See notes 175-78 supra and accompanying text.
197. See note 193 supra. This is not to suggest that cost is the exclusive justifiable
basis for determining rates, although that has been suggested from time to time:
[An electric utility] has a right to fix its rates upon the cost of production, ...
and, acting in good faith, it has a right to make experimental contracts for the
purpose of reaching a basis for future charges, even though this should result in
giving for a limited time a better rate to a few customers than was given to
others receiving substantially the same amount of current.
Graver v. Edison Elec. Ilium. Co., 126 App. Div. 371, 374, 110 N.Y.S. 603, 604-05
(1908). Recent cases, however, do not restrict pricing to cost analysis, and some have
specifically rejected the contention that cost is the sole criterion for allocating rates. See,
e.g., International Materials & Chem. Corp. v. Mayo, 336 So.2d 548, 551-52 (Fla. 1976);
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 551-52, 224 S.E.2d 396, 399
(1976); General Motors Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Ohio St. 2d 58, 75, 351 N.E.2d
183,194 (1976); Globe Metallurgical Div. of Interlake, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 40
Ohio St. 2d 40, 319 N.E.2d 360, 361 (1974).
198. See text accompanying note 61 supra. Also, the revenue constraint may cause
LRIC pricing to fail to ensure customer willingness to pay additional capital costs
depending both on how the revenue constraint is applied and whether the utility is
experiencing increasing costs.
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appears to use in the LRIC sense) is superior to short-run because
taking capital costs into account improves resource allocations and
avoids drastic shifts away from historical cost pricing. He then added:
The very reasons, however, which make the proposal to
set utility rates at long-run marginal costs more "practical"
than the proposal to adjust rates to short-run changes in
marginal costs also constitute reasons for doubting its net
advantage over full-cost pricing [that is, pricing based upon
fully distributed cost-of-service allocations] as a generally
applicable basis of rate control. 199
Since both the noncost and cost alternatives refine the cost-of-service
categories in a manner similar to that of LRIC pricing, they seem even
more attractive than the "full-cost pricing" to which Professor Bon-
bright refers.
Thus, introducing peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service
analysis and implementing it by the predominantly cost alternative
seems the preferable way to get control over growth in quantity
demanded and to improve load-factors. Each of the three alternatives
seem approximately equal in their ability to ensure customers' willing-
ness to cover costs of additional capacity. The next question is whether
the peak-load pricing alternatives avoid some of the disadvantages of
revenue-constrained LRIC pricing.
2. The Proposal That Best Avoids or Mitigates the Disadvantages
of Revenue-Constrained LRIC Pricing
The proposal for peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service analy-
sis provides commissions with relative flexibility to determine how
great to make the peak/off-peak price distinction. This characteristic
offers the means to reduce or avoid some of the disadvantages as-
sociated with revenue-constrained LRIC pricing. A review of the
impact of the peak-load pricing alternative on the problems LRIC
pricing raised demonstrates the utility of that flexibility. For example,
we saw possible revenue instability and political objection flowing
from the shift to the peak/off-peak price distinction in LRIC pricing.
With the peak-load pricing alternative, commissions can reduce these
problems by introducing relatively minor peak/off-peak price distinc-
tions, allowing customers and utilities to accommodate to the distinc-
tions before they become as pronounced as LRIC pricing dictates. In
the same vein, we saw that experience might well indicate that the
peak/off-peak LRIC pricing distinction is insufficient to attain particu-
lar goals for growth in the quantity demanded and improvement of
199. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 141, at 401-02.
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load factors. With the cost-of-service based peak-load pricing alterna-
tive, commissions could legitimately require utilities to enlarge the
distinction in such a case, while LRIC pricing provides no analytical
justification for doing so. Further, we saw that the cost-of-service
approach allows utilities to retain customer-group allocations and thus
avoid groups experiencing income redistributions that cannot be jus-
tified on the theory that they further the purposes of peak-load pricing.
Also, the cost-of-service approach avoids having commissions
more involved in areas of traditional management prerogative while it
maintains the current level of commission control over ratemaking.
This approach allows commissions to make rates as they have in the
past, to add consideration of peak/off-peak prices, and to limit its role
in such traditional management decisions as long-range market expan-
sion and curtailment planning, and long-range land and equipment
purchase planning. As we saw, these latter are integral in LRIC
pricing. 2°°
Further, LRIC pricing presents certain administrative difficulties,
such as problems with the quality of information available to commis-
sions, which historical cost pricing does not.20 1 From the total revenue
perspective, the peak-load pricing proposal founded on traditional
historical cost analysis, does not pose the same risks. Because of our
lack of experience, no alternative is likely to assure the accuracy of the
peak/off-peak rate difference for achieving the commission's policy
goals when initiated. But the essentially noncost alternative's flexibili-
ty makes it superior to the others for commissions that wish to modify
the peak/off-peak rate difference as experience teaches more about
customers' price sensitivity, and for the same reason, the predominant-
ly cost alternative is also preferable to LRIC pricing.
3. Suspicions About a Decision Not to Follow Microeconomic
Theory
Notwithstanding the implications of the foregoing comparison that
the alternative of peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service analysis
and implemented by the predominantly cost method is superior to the
others, we must wonder whether selecting it over the one most related
to the microeconomic principle of marginal cost pricing is unwise. By
selecting this peak-load pricing alternative, we have made it possible
that the primary goal of marginal cost pricing-attaining the best use
of economic resources possible-will become subordinate to other
200. See notes 151-54 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 154-62 supra and accompanying text.
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goals.202 For purposes of economic theory, that result is inappropriate.
But for purposes of commissions' application of public policy to
ratemaking decisions, is that result not entirely correct?
Consider one public policy issue that marginal cost pricing would
ignore-income distribution. Classically, economic theorists contend
that we should not use the pricing system to distribute income. Rather,
they suggest that we should price in ways that achieve the best use of
economic resources and employ a system of taxation and subsidy
payments to achieve income distribution goals.20 3 However, even
ignoring the fact that this nation's taxation system itself probably also
distorts income distribution goals, that proposed solution fails for its
political naivete. In this nation, we consistently accept income distri-
bution policies as a factor in the regulatory process, 20 4 perhaps in many
cases, because that is the only politically feasible mode for imple-
menting those policies. Achieving the best use of economic resources
possible is clearly one public policy goal that commissions should
pursue as they set rates. But other goals-including fair income distri-
bution, economic stability, and others-are likewise important and
should contribute to commission decisions. The peak-load pricing
alternative makes that possible.
202. See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying text.
203. Economic theorists uniformly recognize that their contribution to social welfare
is limited. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 506
(4th ed. 1977); J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMAT-
ICAL APPROACH 255 (2d ed. 1971); J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATION 461
(1976). In the course of their discussion Professors Henderson and Quandt explicity
suggest that economic theory may assist in ascertaining how to maximize resource
allocation, but that lump-sum taxes and subsidies are required to obtain desired income
distribution. J. HENDERSON & R. QuANDT, supra at 255-64, 275. This solution more
often appears in particular policy discussions. Consider, for example, the argument
opposing lowering energy prices below marginal cost in order to subsidize the poor in
Weidenbaum, Financing the Electric Industry, in SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELECTRIC UTILrITES 489
(Comm. Print. 1974). Or, note the argument supporting changing the welfare system to
one simply based on a negative income tax in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
178-82, 190-95 (1962); Friedman, The Case for the Negative Income Tax, 19 NAT'L REV.
(1967).
204. Doing so is sometimes controversial, sometimes not. Consider, for example,
international trade decisions. The pursuit of American foreign policy goals often affects
domestic income distribution by altering the availability of domestic jobs, market sup-
plies, and, in the process, consumer prices. The area bubbled into controversy early in
the Carter Administration. See Shoes, Sugar and TV Sets, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1977, at
18, col. I (editorial); Farnsworth, Rulings on Imports Posing Trade Dilemma for Carter,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1977, at 9, col. 5. A potentially less controversial example is the
Interstate Commerce Commission's limitations on the number of hours during the day
and week that a truck driver may drive. 49 C.F.R. § 395.3 (1976). While the specific
standards are debatable, few would contend that such a standard, if reasonable, does not
serve the interests of highway safety. Meanwhile, however, the standard also has an
income distributive implication by influencing the number of truck drivers employed.
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Moreover, we do not have the alternative of actually basing prices
on marginal cost principles. The proposal to adopt revenue-constrained
LRIC pricing differs widely from pure marginal cost analysis. The
introduction of the "long-run" and "incremental" variations from
pure marginal cost pricing guarantees that LRIC pricing will produce
less than best use of resources.20 5 In addition, applying the revenue
constraint widens the gap between LRIC and marginal cost still furth-
er. Perhaps commissions should obtain LRIC information so that they
may compare that indicated rate structure with the one built from peak-
load pricing based on cost-of-service analysis. Nonetheless, they
should not delude themselves that the information they gather provides
facts for a rate structure that attains the best achievable use of societal
resources.
Some blanch at the suggestion that commissions make public
policy pricing decisions on any basis other than cost, such as that
suggested by the essentially noncost approach. Unless the decision is
cost based, the argument goes, decisions will lack an explicit, publicly
reviewable standard. 2°6 Certainly, constraining decisions with cost
considerations limits commissions' potential for becoming unbridled
"social engineers." However, recognizing cost as one of several
factors in commission decisions applies that constraint without fixing
upon commissions impossible, undesirable standards.
We have already seen that certain decisions in both cost-of-service
allocations and LRIC pricing are not amenable to cost-based analy-
sis. 20 7 Confining ratemaking to the application of microeconomic
theory or any other systematic doctrine is simply not possible, and
those purporting to do so are, at least, inadequately informed. Some
decisions must either be random or based on some public policy
determination. Were we to allow the decisions to be random, we
would actually be permitting the commissions' advisory staffs to make
those policy determinations. Such a result would be bizarre, and to
205. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 Pun. U. REP. (PUR) 3D 401, 448-49
(N.H. Pub. Comm'n 1972) (rejecting a Lifeline proposal on the grounds that it would
require more affluent customers to subsidize the less fortunate, a requirement the
commission believed it could not impose without lesiglation); Re Carolina Power & Light
Co., 9 PuB. U. REP. (PUR) 4TH 129, 141-44 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975). The
commission in Carolina Power, after emphasizing that the rate for each class of custom-
ers is intended to follow their cost of service "to the fullest extent possible," stated that
"it becomes almost impossible to provide special relief through rate structure to one
block of customers without creating serious inequities elsewhere." Id. at 143. Neverthe-
less the South Carolina commission withheld a rate increase from the first 250 kilowatt-
hours of use per month.
207. See notes 182-91 supra and accompanying text.
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avoid it, commissions must base their decisions not amenable to cost
analysis on other public policy grounds.
It is true that recognizing that commissions must base their rate
structuring in part on public policy decisions might suggest that they
should be modified to ensure their political responsiveness. For exam-
ple, perhaps they should be less "independent" and more clearly
subject to control by the legislature or governor. 20 8 On the other hand,
commissions may already be sufficiently politically responsive.
Theoretically and, I suspect, actually for many commissions, they are
the delegate of the state legislature, assigned to carry out its policies.20 9
In any case, as Professor Stone eloquently stated,
the presence of administrative discretion carries responsibili-
ty, as well as the dangers of abuse and dereliction ...
[T]he heart of discretion is the duty to choose, and the duty
to choose implies not only advertence to relevant facts, but a
value-decision, a decision of justice, which overleaps any
mere dictate from the facts. 210
208. One explanation for the decision to transfer the Federal Power Commission and
others' responsibilities to the Department of Energy in a recent administrative reorgani-
zation was a desire to reduce, although not eliminate, that commission's independence.
To see how that worked compare two statements from the relevant Senate Committee
report:
The committee recognized the need for assuring that the important economic
regulatory decisions made up to now by [the Federal Power Commission,
Interstate Commerce Commission, and Federal Energy Administration] would
be, in the future consistent with the Nation's overall policies. Consequently,
the act transfers the functions of these agencies into the new Department.
Provisions in title IV governing the Energy Regulatory Board are designed to
assure a leading role for the Secretary in the regulatory area, and expeditious
action on regultory matters in a manner consistent with overall energy polcy.
S. REP. No. 95-164,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1804, 1840.
[T1e protect the integrity of the regulatory process, and to assure consistency
in that process, title IV assigns primary responsibility for consideration of
major oil and natural gas pricing proposals specified in the act to the Energy
Regulatory Board. The Board will be composed of three members appointed by
the President for a term of 4 years. In addition, the Board will be responsible for
the direct establishment of natural gas and electricity rates, and for granting
certificates and other licenses for oil or natural gas piplines. Formal adjudica-
tory matters will also fall within the Board's jurisdiction.
Id., at 37, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1804, 1841.
209. Professor Cooper, in his treatise State Administrative Law, examined the
propriety of agencies responding to legislatures and legislative policies in considerable
and useful detail. See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 21-29 & Ch. 111 (1965).
For similarly illuminating decisions focused on federal administrative agencies, see H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINSTRATIvE AGENCIES (1962); J. Landis, Report on Regu-
latory Agencies to the President-Elect, printed in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print
1960).
210. Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF. L.
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Whether commissions are sufficiently politically responsible deserves
study elsewhere. However, regardless of the results of that study, the
fact remains that commissions or other responsible authorities neces-
sarily make public policy decisions on rate structuring and, therefore,
should do so consciously and articulately.
To summarize, a comparison of the net advantages of LRIC pricing
and peak-load pricing based on cost-of-service analysis reveals that
peak-load pricing is superior. In some instances, this form of peak-
load pricing is preferable because it provides a more satisfactory
method for overcoming difficulties inherent in the introduction of any
type of peak-load pricing. In addition, peak-load pricing avoids a
number of disadvantages that are peculiar to LRIC pricing. As between
the cost and noncost methods of introducing peak-load pricing, it is
apparent that there are instances in which the noncost alternative is
superior, because it affords the commission or other decisionmaking
authority greater flexibility to adjust the degree of difference between
peak and off-peak prices. On the other hand, the cost-based alternative
retains flexibility in the cost-of-service allocation process, and that
affords the commission considerable latitude in adjusting the peak/off-
peak difference. The cost-based version also avoids the criticism of the
noncost alternative that its standards are so unclearly defined as to
jeopardize the validity of commission decisions subjected to judicial
review. Therefore, I conclude that the preferred method for introduc-
ing peak-load pricing would employ peak-load pricing based on cost-
of-service analysis implemented by the predominantly cost-based
method.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has presented a comparison between historical cost and
LRIC ratemaking in order to evaluate the current proposal that
commissions adopt the LRIC approach. In addition, it has explained
the possibility of selecting an alternative ratemaking reform. That
alternative embraces the end result of LRIC pricing-a price differ-
REV. 513, 531 (1964) (emphasis in original). See also Davis, Comment, in LEGAL INSTrru-
TIONS TODAY AND ToMoRRow 148 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959); Friendly, The Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1263,
1301-02 (1962); Gardner, The Administrative Process in LEGAL INsrrruTONS TODAY AND
ToMoRRow 108, 127-29 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959), quoted in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 19, 24-25 (5th ed. 1970); Jones, The Role of Administrative Agen-
cies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. REV. 279, 299-301 (1966), cited in W.
GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra at 43; Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation 57
VA. L. REV. 1016 (1971); Jaffe, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 858, 863-64 (1963).
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ential between service provided during peak and that provided during
off-peak demand periods-but it is based on the traditional cost-of-
service allocations rather than a marginal cost analysis. A comparision
of the peak-load pricing reform, which could be implemented by a cost
or noncost method, reveals that it holds the hope of achieving the
benefits of revenue-constrained LRIC pricing, but without undertaking
all the risks of the LRIC proposal.
Based upon these considerations, I conclude that public utility
commissions choosing to introduce peak-load pricing will have great-
est success in doing so by retaining (with some modifications) histori-
cal cost analysis and cost-of-service allocations. This leaves unre-
solved, however, whether commissions should institute peak-load pricing
in any form. That depends on the answer to an empirical question: To
what degree is the electricity consumer's demand sensitive to changes
in price? For consumers whose demand is price-sensitive, commis-
sions should impose peak-load pricing. For those not, price signals are
for naught, and we must find other means to induce more rational
consumption of electricity.
1978]
